THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Another Delinquent Dean.

The Dean of Exeter (better known as Dr. W. R. Matthews), in arranging recently for the keeping of the Lenten season in Exeter Cathedral, announced that under the title of 'Our Common Faith' six week-day evening lectures would be delivered by a number of distinguished Christian teachers. Two of them (Professor Goudge and Archdeacon Hunkin) are members of the Church of England and the other four, no less distinguished, are Free Churchmen. The four Free Churchmen and their themes are:

Dr. Wheeler Robinson (Baptist) on 'Revelation.'

Dr. Garvie (Congregationalist) on 'The Christian Ideal of Society).'

Dr. Scott Lidgett (Methodist) on 'The Fatherhood of God.'

Dr. Archibald Fleming (English Presbyterian) on 'The First Creed.'

The announcement, following so shortly on the delinquency of the Dean of Liverpool, has raised a storm of protest in Church circles in Devonshire. And as a consequence all the clergy of that large diocese have been requested to take this 'opportunity of expressing their opinion on the grave action of the Dean and Chapter in arranging that Nonconformist ministers shall preach in the Cathedral on certain evenings in Lent.'

The protest which they are invited to sign, while expressing great indebtedness to the Dean and Chapter for the inspiring character of the Cathedral services, also affirms their deep regret at the Dean's invitation to Nonconformists as 'calculated to effect confusion rather than unity.' The reasons given for the protest are as follows:

'We submit, and we respectfully but strongly maintain, that a Cathedral is not a forum. It is, we hold, something not less essential but different; namely, a seat of authority, from which it is declared what the Christian Faith is, and who has been appointed to teach it.

The distinguished Nonconformist scholars who have been invited no doubt enjoy a welcome amount of agreement with each other and with us, for which we are unfeignedly thankful. But if they were agreed in nothing else, they must be at one with each other in averting their gaze from the *cathedra,* that symbol of a claim which each of them rejects. Yet the Bishop's Throne is a difficult thing to overlook, and not that for its size alone. It is not an incidental piece of furniture which a Cathedral happens to contain, but the *raison d'être* of the building which is named after it. It announces the purpose for which the Cathedral was built, and to which it has witnessed for eight hundred years. So far as a building may express a doctrine, our Cathedral, in name, history, and significance, stands for the belief that a man who aspires to teach Apostolic truth must not refuse Episcopal sanction.

The addresses, arranged under the title of 'Our Common Faith,' are to be delivered by scholars who not only impugn this belief, but owe their selection as preachers to their being representative teachers of various reasons for rejecting it. We consider that this can only deepen the existing confusion upon the issues of religious truth.

And such confusion spreads. It extends beyond the boundaries of the Cathedral Close or the City to the remotest parish of the Diocese. For just as every deepening of Church life is felt, to our joy and comfort, in the parishes, so every novel expedient, every adjustment of principle to the claims of geniality, reacts upon parochial work and witness. Already most of us find sufficient difficulty in persuading our flocks that the pulpit of their Church is the vehicle of a faith proclaimed with authority, and not of individual or sectional views. In nearly every parish the parish church would be the most convenient place for the general discussion of religious opinions, if it could legitimately be so employed. The safeguards against such misuse are the Sacrament of Ordination, the Bishop's commission, the degree to which a clergyman is able to subordinate his views to his vows, and the amount of encouragement he receives from Churchmen in positions of higher authority and responsibility.

For these reasons we are constrained to express the earnest hope that the Cathedral may serve the cause of unity, not by gestures of agreement towards those who do not yet agree, but rather by the patient assertion of the Apostolic order as the appointed bond of Christian fellowship.'

The Bishop of Exeter (Lord William Cecil) has been moved by his Dean's delinquency to deal with the sin of lawlessness. He writes in the January *Exeter Diocesan Gazette*:

'What is especially distressing, and marks a loss of moral ideal which is most regrettable, is that there are many ecclesiastics who have ceased to see how serious is the sin of lawlessness. . . . In all schools of our Church we see a contempt for law which augurs ill for the future of the Anglican Church. . . . There are churches in this diocese where neither new nor old Prayer Books are obeyed, but where all sorts of practices are justified because in the mediaeval period they were the law of our Church.'

When interviewed by the representative of the *Exeter Express and Echo* (published on January 26), the Bishop is reported to have said about the Dean's delinquency:

'If I had been asked, I should certainly have refused permission, as I always have to other clergy. But I have no doubt that it will have a very good effect in promoting unity between the Church and Nonconformity, and I have no doubt that the Dean, who is one of the holiest of men, as well as one of the most eloquent, is doing it from the highest of motives. If I blame anyone I blame his legal advisers. I have no doubt, for myself, what the law is. In my reading, it is distinctly against the canon of the Church passed in 1865. In that year the old canon which had existed since the days of Charles II was repealed, and a new canon substituted for it. The difference between the two canons was this, that the old canon required a much more exact adherence to the Thirty-nine Articles. The new canon only requires assent, and it has been held that assent only means that they will not preach against the Thirty-nine Articles. But the assent must be made formally before the Bishop, and it must be formally recorded. . . . The only exception in this diocese was the occasion on which the Methodist body had their great annual meeting at Plymouth. Then, it is true, we allowed them to speak in church, but they in no sense gave any sermon. They simply exchanged speeches with us: we welcomed them, and they expressed their appreciation and friendliness to us. With that exception — if it was an exception — I have always observed the law. Not that I agree with it.

I think it is a great pity that we cannot have more co-operation with our Nonconformist brothers. But there is the greatest difference between agreeing with a law and commending it, and keeping it.

There are many laws which many people would hold to be unwise, but they are none the less laws, and they should keep them. That is, I believe, the fundamental principle of all civilized life. You must not ask yourself, "Do I like the law?" The question is, "Is it the law? If so, I must keep it." As it stands I do not like the law; I dislike it, but I keep it. . . . If a proposal was brought forward for an alteration in the law, I should vote for the alteration.'

The Bishop of Exeter in his admirably explicit decision on this issue seems to us to omit to deal with a very important aspect of the subject. What is my duty as a Diocesan Bishop and as a member of the Upper House of Convocation in regard to a law which I believe to be prejudicial to the furtherance of Christian unity? Am I to be satisfied simply with asserting that

though I do not like the law yet it ought to be loyally obeyed, or ought I not to add that I am resolved with all the influence and energy I can command to secure its immediate abrogation or amendment?

There can be no doubt what is the Bishop's duty in this matter, and not only his, but the duty of all our bishops who have been expressing for years past their desire for more brotherly relations with our Free Church brethren. The whole question of fellowship with the Free Churches seems, to many, to be surrounded with an atmosphere of unreality and insincerity as the result of the failure of those, who make these professions, to take any practical step to carry them out.

The Dean, in the *Monthly Bulletin* of Exeter Cathedral for February, 1934, declares that 'nothing has ever surprised me more' than the protest, and defends himself by asserting 'that the Dean and Chapter are "Ordinary" of the Cathedral and have therefore the right to order the services of the Cathedral.' He also defends himself by appealing to a resolution of the Lambeth Conference of 1920, which runs as follows:

> 'A bishop is justified in giving occasional authorization to ministers, not episcopally ordained, who in his judgment are working towards an ideal of union such as is described in our appeal to preach in churches within his diocese.'

This resolution, he points out, has not been allowed to become a dead letter. Various bishops have acted on it. This very week the Bishop of London has authorized Dr. Campbell Morgan (a Congregationalist minister) to preach in a parish church in his diocese. The Dean does not believe 'that the bishops at Lambeth encouraged each other to do an illegal act, or that bishops up and down the country have been performing such acts for thirteen years.'

There seems no doubt, as Lord Hugh Cecil has demonstrated, that the bishops have been acting illegally in this matter, and this the Dean himself admits when he writes a little later:

> 'No doubt the strict interpretation of the Act of Uniformity and the judgments of the Privy Council would condemn every special service and many other things which have become almost universal.'

The Dean takes a stronger line when he pleads the urgent necessity for such action:

'Many Church people seem to be grievously blind to the present crisis of our nation and its religion. There is a mighty struggle going on for the soul of the nation. The forces of atheism, irreligion and indifference are strong and are growing stronger. The younger men and women are wondering whether Christianity has any message for them. Does anyone suppose that the Church of England by itself can meet the crisis? We may wish that it could: but if we look facts in the face, we shall have to admit that nothing less than the mobilization of the whole resources of Christianity can avail.'

We regret to add that, notwithstanding the reasonableness of the Dean's defence, his fellow-clergy have refused to condone his delinquency, and up to date over three hundred have signed the protest against his action. On the other hand, the Devonshire Press and public, with more insight, are entirely in favour of the Dean.

A New Kind of Church Congress.

In *St. Martin's Review* for January, 1934, Dr. Sheppard makes the following suggestion in the interest of a real and vital comprehensiveness in the Church of England:

Why should not Anglo-Catholic Congresses, Protestant Conventions and Modern Churchmen's Conferences gather their followers together this year, not to hear yet over again the party speeches in which they so delight, but to consider their strength as presented by a reverent speaker who is not of their persuasion, and their weakness as pointed out by a leader who is heart and soul on their own side? Is it conceivable that a more purposeful and educative venture could take place than an Anglo-Catholic Conference at which, say, the Bishop of Liverpool spoke of the strength of the Catholic position, while Prebendary Mackay pointed out its weakness; or a Protestant Conference at which the rôle of advocate and critic was taken by the Bishop of St. Albans and the Bishop of Chelmsford respectively; or a Modern Churchmen's Conference in which the value of the Modernist position was upheld by the Bishop of Truro, and its weakness spoken of by Dr. Major? And what about a meeting of the Group Movement where Dr. Buchman spoke of its dangers and the Bishop of Durham of its hopes? Each speaker could perform his part superlatively well, and is it conceivable that the audiences would go away unenlightened? At last they would begin to learn what lip service to a comprehensive Church entails.

We believe there is urgent need for such a Conference, and we are sure that Dr. Sheppard is the man to organize it. We should certainly be glad to deal, and with some vigour, with the weakness of the Modernist position, and even more vigorously with the weakness of Modernists.

'The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves, that we are underlings.'

But to understand and deal with the weaknesses of our own point of view is not all that Dr. Sheppard requires. He demands that each should strive to understand the strength of his opponent's position and that the truth for which that position stands is essential for the welfare of the Church as a whole. The clash would come when one school determined that the essential truth for which its opponents stood was not truth at all. We believe, however, that the leaders of the three great schools within the Church of England to-day have reached a degree of enlightenment which does enable them to recognize the essential truth, and the value of the essential truth, in the position of their opponents.

MODERNIST PROPAGANDA IN THE FREE CHURCHES.

The Free Christian,* which began its career on 'the third Saturday' of January, 1934, thus expounds its *raison d'être* :

> 'This world is a changing world. Ideas have undergone a wholesale transformation in the last fifty years. Biblical criticism, the common acceptance of the idea of evolution, the scientific spirit that has become part, and an essential part, of modern education : all this has demanded that the leaders of Christian thought should be prepared to think through their faith afresh in the light of modern knowledge. And especially in the light of modern psychology and Biblical criticism. The leaders have done that. But their thoughts have not filtered down. And it will be one of the main purposes of this paper to bring the best thought as it bears upon his religious life to the notice of the busy man who has not the time to be a specialist in these things.'

The purpose of the magazine is both educative and apologetic. It is rightly recognized that the competent use of our modern knowledge can constitute the best defence of the Christian religion and the most powerful means of its propaganda. *The Free Christian* asserts in this connection that :

> 'Most of the criticism of religion from the sceptic of to-day is based upon a view of the Christian religion which may have been true a hundred years ago, but which is not true now. We believe that if only Christianity were understood by men, then three-quarters of the hostility of the atheist against it would die a natural death. He is not attacking Christianity : he is merely attacking a bogey that he likes to call the Christian religion.'

We need however to be just to the man who makes these attacks. Why does he regard the Christian religion as a bogey? It is because he has been taught it by Christian teachers, and the

* Published by the Free Christian Press, Swansea ; price 3*d*.

Christian Church in many of its branches has not had the courage openly and drastically to repudiate this bogey. How many Christian Churches have definitely repudiated their traditionalist errors? What they have done in many cases is to retreat or advance from their old traditional positions while pretending to their more conservative adherents not to have moved at all. No doubt individual Christian teachers have sacrificed popularity and promotion, have excited irritation and suspicion, by open disavowals of traditionalist error, but how many Churches have done this? Is it surprising then that the plain, honest man who consults Church formularies and authoritative Church documents, with their pre-scientific perversion of Christian truth, should confuse the Christian religion with its traditionalist bogies? It was one of the tragedies in the life of Studdert Kennedy that he found that this *impedimenta* of the past militated against the effective delivery of a modern Christian message by a modern Christian teacher by creating an initial prejudice against his whole position. He wrote:

> 'It is awful to realize that when one stands up to preach Christ, the soldier feels that you are defending a whole ruck of obsolete theories and antiquated muddles.'

When the essential Gospel, stripped of its traditionalist accretions, is delivered to the plain man, his feeling is: 'O, yes, those are the views of Mr. A. I think what he says is true, but we all know that his is not the teaching of the Church and the Creeds and the Hymn Book. We know that most of his fellow-clergymen look on him as a heretic.'

The plain man in search of a religion, although attracted by Mr. A.'s preaching, does not wish to become an adherent of Mr. A., but an adherent of the Christian Church of which Mr. A. is an official; but when he goes to the Church and inspects its authoritative documents, then he knows that his rational, moral and spiritual consciousness forbid his membership. A Church which has not the faith and courage to reform its formularies in the light of new truth has no right to complain if plain men identify Christianity with bogeydom.

We are glad to see that the editorial board of *The Free Christian* does not at the outset commit the folly of setting its sails to catch every wind. It writes:

'We do not represent any body of Christians, except those who can call themselves modern in their outlook and evangelical in their convictions.'

Among the contributors to the first number are Dr. Wheeler Robinson and Professor Garvie. Among future contributors will be Dr. Cadoux and Dr. Theodore Robinson. These are guarantors of its quality. We wish the venture every success.

BIBLICAL BOOKS FOR THE BIRMINGHAM CONFERENCE.

In view of the Modern Churchmen's Conference to be held at Selly Oak September 3—8, 1934, which will undertake to consider the subject of the Bible and the Modern Man, we would suggest to busy people who wish to study the subject beforehand that they should read some of the following books.

Perhaps the best to begin with is Dr. Fosdick's *The Modern Use of the Bible* (published by S.C.M., 3/6). It treats the difficulty which a modern Christian layman has expressed in the following paragraph:

'Six days in the week we live in an ordered world. On the seventh, we open the church door on a land of topsy-turvy, where axes float, dry sticks change to serpents, cities are let down out of the sky, angels stir the water of wells, bedevilled swine run violently into the sea. We say prayers for rain an hour after we have consulted a government bulletin to see whether we shall need an umbrella before we get home. We solemnly repeat, "... Maker of heaven and earth ... descended into Hell ... sitteth on the right hand of God ..." Yet all the while we know perfectly well that heaven is not "up" nor hell "down," that this universe was never "made" by anybody in any such sense as the "apostles" supposed, nor has it any such topographical relations as they assumed. Whoso has sat with his eye at one end of a brass tube and a fragment of the everlasting mystery at the other, knows that no living being, from pond scum to mammal, ever gets into this unintelligible world by virtue of any process that in the least resembles anything that the days of ignorance meant by "*conceptus*": while as for "*carnis resurrectionem,*" which, as a piece of psychophysics, we inherit from the followers of Zarathustra by way of the Pharisees and St. Paul, most of us actually do hold the diametrically opposite opinion — the Platonic doctrine of the immortality of the soul.'

In view of the yawning chasm which separates the modern man from the Bible two questions may well be asked:

(1) Is it worth while to attempt to bridge such a chasm?

(2) Is it possible to bridge it?

Every modern student of the Bible who has exchanged the

traditional view of the Bible for that which modern criticism provides, will hold that it is worth while, but he will also realize that there is no royal road or back stairs by which it can be accomplished. It can only be done by study, and that means for most men to-day reading the right books in the right way.

Dr. Fosdick holds that there are four ways in which a modern man may know his Bible. 'The first is to be acquainted with its beauty spots . . . The second way to know the Bible is to know its individual books . . . A third way to know the Bible is to know its characters . . . ' The fourth way is to know the Bible as a whole. In other words, as a literature which makes known to its trained student the history of the evolution of moral, spiritual and rational religion.

> 'Only as a man is able to trace up through the whole Scripture the development of its structural ideas does he really know the Bible.'

Dr. Fosdick's volume gives excellent Bibliographies at the end of each chapter. As they do not, however, contain some of the latest books bearing on the subject we here add a few more especially for those who propose to attend the Modern Churchmen's Conference in Birmingham.

Oxford Helps to the Study of the Bible. (Oxford Press.)
The Heart of the Bible. By Jeannie B. Thomson Davies, M.A. (Three volumes; 5/- each. Allen & Unwin. 1933.)
The Development of Hebrew Religion. By Oesterley and Robinson. (S.P.C.K.)
Outline of Old Testament Theology. By C. F. Burney.
Prophets and Prophecy. By Theodore Robinson.
Prophecy and Religion. By J. Skinner.
Between the Two Testaments. By R. H. Charles.
Jerusalem under the High Priests. By Edwyn Bevan.
From Babylon to Bethlehem. By L. E. Brown.
The Four Gospels: An Exposition for Laymen. By B. H. Streeter.
The Gospel History and its Transmission. By F. C. Burkitt.
The New Testament in the Twentieth Century. By Maurice Jones.
The Gospel before the Gospels. By B. S. Easton.
Christ in the Gospels. By B. S. Easton.
Formation of the Gospel Tradition. By Vincent Taylor.
New Testament. By A. H. McNeile.
St. Paul: His Life, Letters and Christian Doctrine. By A. H. McNeile.
Conscience, Creeds and Critics. By C. W. Emmet.

ARE UNITARIANS CHRISTIANS?

By the Editor

THE Unitarians claim the name of Christian. They claim their place within the great Christian heritage. They claim to be members of Christ's Church and that their faith is the faith which Jesus Himself taught. We have observed an unfortunate tendency in the recent protest against Unitarians preaching in Liverpool Cathedral, to deny to them the name of Christian. This denial seems to us as unjust as it is fanatical.

There are various tests of what constitutes Christianity. There is the *dogmatic* test. It is a popular one in ecclesiastical circles. By the test of the Nicene Creed and the subsequent action of the General Councils, Unitarians are excluded from Church membership. They are no doubt deprived thereby of the titles Catholic and Orthodox, but not of Christian. When, however, we use the dogmatic test to decide whether anyone is a Christian, we are compelled to acknowledge that Christ gives no authority for the application of this test.

Christ's test of discipleship was not dogmatic, but the test of *conduct and character*: 'by their fruits ye shall know them.' 'Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things that I say?' Judged by this test the Unitarians stand high. Business integrity, domestic purity, noble philanthropy, enlightened public service have characterized them as a denomination. If, in every nation, he that worketh righteousness is acceptable to Christ, then who can forbid the title of Christian to these men?

But besides the test of character and conduct, there is also the test of *prayer and worship*. *Lex orandi est lex credendi*—as a man prays, so he believes. In that case every man who can and does say the Lord's prayer from the heart is a Christian, and there is no doubt that Unitarians do this. In this connection it is of interest to turn to the *Orders of Worship* prepared for Unitarian congregations and published by the Lindsey Press in 1932. In that book we find the following prayers:

> Almighty God, who didst send thy Son to establish a kingdom of righteousness on earth, we earnestly beseech thee for the whole Christian Church. Fill it with all truth, and in all truth with all peace. Where it is right, strengthen and confirm it: where it is in error,

direct it: where it is in want, supply it: where it is divided and rent asunder, unite and heal it. And we beseech thee, O God our Father, for all such as labour in any ministry of righteousness that the guidance of thy Holy Spirit may be with them, and that they may be found wise, steadfast, and zealous in the service of thy kingdom.

(*From the Service for Christmas Day.*)

Almighty God, who hast revealed the glory of thy love in the face of Jesus Christ, and called us by him to live with thee as children: fill our hearts, as we remember his birth, with the gladness of his Gospel. We would join in the heavenly song of Glory to God in the highest, on earth peace, and goodwill towards men. Breathe into our hearts the spirit of Jesus, that we may be led to thee in trust and obedience, and be sent out to live among men in brotherly love and sympathy. Every year, as this joyful festival returns, may it find the world more and more in harmony with thy will, which has been made known to us through him. We ask it in his name.

We bless and praise thee, O God, for the great gift of thy goodness in him whose birth we now commemorate. We would pay the glad homage of our gratitude and love at the lowly cradle in which Jesus was laid when he was born to bless the world: and would echo in our hearts the angelic song of peace and good-will. As now our homes are gladdened by the joyful meeting of kindred and friends, so may our hearts be filled, not now only but at all times, with the true spirit of kindness and brotherly affection. May the bright promise of the Gospel of Love be fulfilled in us, and may the day-spring from on high arise on every heart, to give light to them that sit in darkness and in the shadow of death, and to guide our feet into the way of peace.

From the Unitarian Book of Occasional Services we select the following:

O God, our Heavenly Father, who by thy Son hast consecrated for us a new and living way into the holiest of all, even the way of filial trust and love and sacrifice, grant unto us, we beseech thee, the assurance of thy mercy, sanctify us by thy Holy Spirit, that our fellowship at this time may be with thee our Father, with Jesus Christ whom thou didst send, and with all who are one with him and thee, in spirit and in truth.

(*Exhortation in the Holy Communion Service.*)

In this service we commemorate a great friendship and a great sacrifice. We come together to have communion with God through Jesus Christ, that we may quicken and renew our fellowship with him, and increase the power and sincerity of our discipleship.

(*Post-Communion Prayer.*)

Remember, O Lord, thy whole Church this day: deliver us from all evil: perfect us in thy love: and gather us all together from the four winds into thy kingdom: for thine is the glory and the power for ever.

(*Concluding Blessing.*)

The peace of God, which passeth all understanding, keep our hearts and minds in the knowledge and love of God, and of his Son, Jesus Christ: and the blessing of God, the Father Almighty, be amongst us and remain with us always.

Some of our readers will no doubt recognize that the Post-Communion Prayer is taken from the *Didache*, and is probably the oldest Communion Prayer extant.

When we turn to the Hymn Book authorized for use in Unitarian churches* we find a very wide selection of beautiful hymns, the majority of them composed by those who were not Unitarians, such as Charles Wesley, John Keble, Isaac Watts, Joseph Addison, Jeremy Taylor, A. P. Stanley, H. H. Milman, Bonar, Doddridge, Baring Gould, Monsell, etc. etc. Such universal favourites as 'While shepherds watched,' 'It came upon a midnight clear,' 'O little town of Bethlehem,' 'Hark the glad sound, the Saviour comes,' 'Hark, the herald-angels sing,' 'Christians awake, salute the happy morn,' 'New every morning is the love,' 'Sun of my soul,' 'There is a book,' 'At even ere the sun was set,' 'Ride on, ride on, in majesty,' 'Jesus Christ is risen to-day,' 'Our Blest Redeemer,' 'I heard the voice of Jesus say,' 'Jesus calls us o'er the tumult,' 'Art thou weary,' 'Onward, Christian soldiers,' 'Fight the good fight,' 'For all the saints who from their labours rest' are included in the collection.

It may interest our readers to learn that Hosmer, perhaps the most distinguished of all our modern hymn-writers — many of whose hymns are in our latest Anglican hymn books — was a Unitarian. So of course was J. Russell Lowell, the author of the magnificent hymn 'Once to every man and nation.' So also was Sir J. Bowring, the author of 'In the Cross of Christ I glory.' The late King Edward's favourite hymn, 'Nearer my God to thee,' was also written by a Unitarian, Sarah F. Adams.

Where we find Christian character, conduct and devotion it is impossible to deny the title of Christian to their possessors. Our theology of course is Trinitarian, and that theology they are in many cases unable to accept dogmatically, but their religious life reflects the threefold Christian experience of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

* Published by the Lindsey Press in 1927.

CHRIST AS LOGOS AND SON OF GOD*

By the Very Rev. H. Rashdall, D.Litt., D.D., D.C.L., LL.D., F.B.A.,
Dean of Carlisle.

[Having been requested by a number of our readers to deal with an issue raised indirectly by the recent Liverpool Cathedral conflict: In what sense can a modern Christian understand and affirm that Jesus Christ is 'Very God,' we have thought it well to republish a paper read to the Girton Conference of 1921 by Dean Rashdall, a great scholar and sincere Christian.—Ed. *M.C.*]

THERE is, I think, a growing demand that Liberal Theologians should say in quite definite terms what they really mean when they use the traditional language about the 'Divinity of Christ.' It is not easy to do this in twenty-five minutes, but I will try. I trust you will forgive the appearance of dogmatism which must be involved in such a summary statement of conclusions, without much argument or defence, as is possible under the conditions prescribed for the present discussion.

In the first place it will be well to enumerate some of the things which we do not and cannot mean by ascribing Divinity to Christ.

(1) Jesus did not claim Divinity for Himself. He may have called Himself, or more probably allowed Himself to be called, the Messiah or Son of God. But never in any critically well-attested sayings is there anything which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than that of a man towards God—the attitude which He wished that all men should adopt towards God. The speeches of the Fourth Gospel, where they go beyond the Synoptic conception, cannot be regarded as history, valuable as they may be for theology.[1] The doctrine of our

* This paper is printed exactly as it was delivered.

[1] I do not know of any scholar, however orthodox and conservative, who affirms that the discourses of Christ in the Fourth Gospel are verbatim reports, or denies that they are more or less coloured by the ideas of the Evangelist. Their whole tone and style is obviously so different from that of the Synoptic Gospels, that if we accept the Synoptic discourses as substantially authentic (though not of course in every detail, for there are considerable discrepancies between them), it is impossible to regard the

Lord's divinity must be taken to express the Church's conception of what Jesus is or should be to His followers and to the world, not His own theory about Himself.

(2) It obviously follows from this admission that Jesus was in the fullest sense a man, as much so as any other human being, that He had not merely a human body, but a human soul, intellect, will.[2] This was not always recognized by the Church. Many of the earlier Greek fathers — Irenaeus, for instance, and Athanasius — obviously thought of Him simply as the Logos of God residing in a human body. Later councils condemned this position in the person of Apollinarius: from the point of view of later theology it cannot be too strongly asserted that Athanasius was an Appollinarian. And I fear a great many people who now think themselves particularly orthodox are really Apollinarians too. I have known quite advanced 'Catholics' — not by any means stupid or ignorant people—who simply did not know that the Church teaches that Christ had a human soul. When a Sunday School teacher asks his class, 'Who was Jesus Christ?' and tries to elicit the answer, 'God,' without the addition of the all-important 'and man,' he too is teaching

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Johannine discourses as equally accurate reports: and even in this Gospel few sentences (when taken apart from the Preface, which does not pretend to represent the words of Jesus, and other comments of the Evangelist) imply actual 'Godhead' in the sense of post-Nicene theology. 'Is it not written in your law, I said (to the Judges of Israel) Ye are gods? If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came . . . say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?' The claim to be the Son of God does not *necessarily* imply 'Godhead.' This requires to be still more remembered in the Synoptists. The Jews, however highly some of them may have exalted the Messiah, never thought of him as God or as equal with God. However close the union which the Christ of the Synoptists feels to exist between Himself and God, the distinction is always preserved. The claim that He would judge the world (if actually made) would not imply 'Godhead,' cf. *Acts* xvii, 31: 'A day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by *the man* whom he hath ordained.' It is clear that till the Confession of Caesarea Philippi, Jesus had not claimed to be the Messiah or Son of God, and (if we accept all the words subsequently said to have been uttered by Him) He never claimed more than this. Even *Luke* x, 22, though it implies a very high conception of His own Divine Mission, does not imply 'Godhead.'

[2] 'Perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and human flesh subsisting' (*Athanasian Creed*). The last words are obviously explanatory of the term 'man.' The reasonable soul is the human soul.

Apollinarianism. Much so-called orthodoxy is really Appollinarianism; and some defenders of the Catholic faith, who are too well informed to become downright Apollinarians, are really under the influence of that heresy in the later reduced form of it which denied that Christ had a human will. It is curious to note that that fiery *malleus hereticorum*, the Bishop of Zanzibar, quite definitely lapses into Monothelitism.

(3) It is equally unorthodox to suppose that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed. There is simply no basis for such a doctrine unless (with Origen) we say that all human souls exist before their birth into the world: but that is not the usually accepted Catholic position. St. Paul, indeed, believed in the pre-existence of the heavenly Messiah or Son of God — without distinguishing between the human and the divine or semi-divine Christ — but from the time when the Logos Christology was accepted by the Church, it has been held that what pre-existed was the divine Logos, not the human Jesus.

(4) The Divinity of Christ does not *necessarily* imply the Virgin Birth or any other miracle. The Virgin Birth, if it could be historically proved, would be no demonstration of Christ's Divinity, nor would the disproof of it throw any doubt upon that doctrine. The Synoptic Gospels, which do not assert the Divinity of Christ, do in their present form narrate the Virgin Birth. The Fourth Gospel, which does assert the Divinity of the Logos, knows nothing of the Virgin Birth.

(5) The Divinity of Birth does not imply omniscience. Since the appearance of Bishop Gore's Bampton Lectures, it has been unnecessary to labour that point, though the doctrine of a limitation of Christ's knowledge has not yet sunk into the popular mind. We still hear the conclusions of the higher criticism refuted by appeals to our Lord's acquiescence in the common Jewish views about the authorship or date of Old Testament books. I must add that Bishop Gore himself does not push his admissions to anything like the point which is imperatively demanded by an honest and critical study of the Gospel narratives. There is no more reason for supposing that Jesus of Nazareth knew more than His contemporaries about the true scientific explanation of the mental diseases which current belief attributed to diabolic possession, than that He knew

more about the authorship of the Pentateuch or the Psalms.[3] And even if we reduce (as I personally am disposed to do) the genuine eschatological sayings to a minimum, it is difficult to deny that our Lord entertained some expectations about the future which history has not verified.[4]

So much for the negative side. In what sense do these admissions allow of our still attributing Divinity to Jesus, and finding a permanent meaning in the formulae of the Creeds and the Councils? Everything turns upon our conception of the true relation between God and man in general — and that is a vast problem which it is impossible here to discuss. I can only say this much. If 'divine' and 'human' are thought of as mutually exclusive terms, if God is thought of as simply the Maker of man, if man is thought of as merely a machine or an animal having no community of nature with the universal Spirit who is the cause or source or 'ground' of the existence alike of Nature and of other spirits, then indeed it would be absurd to maintain that one human being, and one only, was both God and man at the same time. But such a view of the relation between God and man would not at the present day be accepted by any philosophy which finds any real place for God in its conception of the universe.

That man is not merely the creature and plaything of God, that there is a certain community of nature between God and man, that all human minds are reproductions 'in limited modes' (to use the expression of my old master, T. H. Green) of the Divine Mind, that in all true human thinking there is a reproduction of the Divine thought, and above all that in the highest ideals which the human conscience recognizes there is a revela-

[3] This does not imply (as is sometimes suggested) that in the spiritual region He 'knew no more than an ordinary man.' The idea of Christ as the supreme Revealer of God obviously implies the contrary.

[4] Personally I think it probable that all the more definite statements about a 'coming again' and a supernatural Judgement in the immediate future are due to the ideas of the disciples rather than to Christ Himself, but it would be disastrous to make the Divinity of Christ depend upon a particular answer to this most difficult problem. We know that our Lord did not claim to know the date of the Judgement, but to contend that He never used any of the current Apocalyptic phrases suggestive of a date nearer than 1900 years would involve a somewhat drastic dealing with the documents.

tion of the ideal eternally present in the Divine Mind — these are the presuppositions under which alone any real meaning can be given to the doctrine. All modern philosophers who recognize that the knowledge of God is possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge by thinking of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest. And philosophical teachers have not been slow to identify this view with the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation, however severely they may criticize the form which the doctrine has received in the traditional theology. Professor Pringle-Pattison, for instance, in his *Idea of God* (a work of which I would speak with profound admiration), has written :

> ' We are far too apt to mechanize the great doctrine of the Incarnation, which forms the centre of the Christian faith. Whatever else it may mean, it means at least this — that in the conditions of the highest human life we have access, as nowhere else, to the inmost nature of the divine. " God manifest in the flesh " is a more profound philosophical truth than the loftiest flight of speculation that outsoars all predicates and, for the greater glory of God, declares Him unknowable.'[5]

He goes on to complain, as philosophers usually do, that this ' Incarnation of the Son has been limited to a single individual.'[6]

I quite agree with him that it is impossible to maintain that God is fully incarnate in Christ and not incarnate at all in anyone else. On the other hand, the philosophical critics of theology do not, as it appear to me, recognize how spiritually valueless — nay, how ethically pernicious — such a doctrine becomes when God is thought of as incarnating Himself equally in all human beings, the worst as well as the best. If we say 'human nature is divine,' and stop there, we enter upon a line of thought which ends in the Hindoo theology or the very similar Absolutist philosophy which recognizes no cosmic significance in human morality, and places God ' beyond good and evil.' There is much in human nature which is not divine at all. It is just because it so emphatically negatives such a non-moral doctrine of divine immanence that the Christian doctrine of a supreme Incarnation in *one* historical Person becomes so valuable. Professor Pringle-Pattison himself (who is no Abso-

[5] *The Idea of God*, p. 157.
[6] *Idem*, p. 409.

lutist, though he is too fond of Absolutist phrases which, I venture to think, do not express his real belief) recognizes that it is 'in the conditions of *the highest* human life that we have access as nowhere else to the inmost nature of the divine.' If we once recognize that it is especially in the moral consciousness at its highest, and in the lives which are most completely dominated by such a moral consciousness, that God is revealed, then it becomes possible to accept the doctrine that in a single human life God is revealed more completely than in any other. If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent*; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men: if we believe that up to the coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the whole progressive revelation of God (especially, though by no means exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it becomes possible to believe that in one man the self-revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique. That we are justified in thinking of God as like Christ, that the character and teaching of Christ contains the fullest disclosure both of the character of God Himself and of His will for man — that is (so far as so momentous a truth can be summed up in a few words) the true meaning for us of the doctrine of Christ's Divinity.

Such at bottom is the permanent meaning of that doctrine of the Logos and the Holy Trinity in which this conviction clothed itself under the influence of Greek philosophical conceptions and terminology. The doctrine of the Logos grew up at a time when the Neo-platonic idea of the transcendence of God, His aloofness from the world, His inaccessibility to human thought or effort, had been pushed to a point which made it seem impossible that He should express Himself in created things or created minds without some sort of intermediary. The Reason or Thought or Word of God — the thought concept, be it remembered, rather than the spoken word — was conceived of as such an intermediary. God gave birth to the Logos and the Logos gave birth to the world. In the

books of Proverbs and Wisdom the Logos, or rather the Wisdom of God (which is practically the same conception) is personified in a semi-poetic manner as the Assessor who stood at God's right hand in the creation of the universe. In the Alexandrian Jew Philo the idea becomes more metaphysical. Practically everything that is said of the Word or the Son in the Fourth Gospel is said of the Logos in Philo, except his incarnation in the historic Jesus. In Philo the conception of the Logos has no connexion at all with the Messianic idea. That is the original thought of the Fourth Gospel — the master-stroke of its author's genius. But St. Paul, by attributing to Jesus all that the Apocalyptists had said about the heavenly Son of God or Messiah, had reached along another path much the same conception of the Messiah as the fourth Evangelist expressed by saying that the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us. And the Johannine doctrine had great advantages over the Pauline. It was much less associated with Apocalyptic mythology. It made it possible to admit that the human Jesus had a beginning in time like other men, and to confine preexistence to the divine element in the historic Personality. Moreover, instead of presenting Christ as a semi-divine being hovering between the divine and the human, it enabled the theologian to say frankly that that in Jesus which was human was absolutely human, while that in Him which was divine was absolutely divine. There remained, indeed, the problem of the relation between this 'Word' which was God and yet incarnate in the human Jesus, and the Father-God, whose only-begotten Son He was. Was this Word personal or impersonal? If personal, how can we escape Polytheism? And if the Logos be identified with the one God, what becomes of the distinction between Father and Logos? I cannot here sketch the history of that long controversy out of which the orthodox Christology was eventually evolved, but I should like to note two or three points which are valuable for the modern re-interpretation of the doctrine.

(1) In the more philosophical Fathers such as Justin, and above all Origen, it was quite distinctly admitted that the Logos was not united to Jesus alone. He had dwelt in the prophets.

He had inspired Socrates and Plato. It was asserted only that the incarnation in Jesus was something supreme and unique.[7]

(2) Many of the earlier Fathers did quite definitely tend to think of the Logos as a distinct personality—a separate mind, will, centre of consciousness from the Father: the Son before the incarnation was thought of as related to the Father very much as, for an intelligent pagan, Apollo was related to Zeus; but the more distinct the personality, the more definite also is the subordination. When Athanasius made the Divine Son equal to the Father, co-eternal, 'of the substance of the Father,' he was distinctly an innovator, but an innovator who saved the Church from the Polytheism into which it was drifting. In making the distinction between the Father and the Logos a distinction within the nature of the one Divine Being, he prepared the way for a more philosophical and genuinely monotheistic interpretation of the Logos doctrine and of that doctrine of the Trinity which had grown out of it.

(3) In St. Augustine, and still more distinctly in St. Thomas Aquinas and the Schoolmen generally, it becomes evident that nothing is left of that older conception of Christ as a distinct, a 'second' and inferior God which is found in Justin and the earlier fathers. The Logos now becomes not a separate mind, but a distinguishable activity of the one and only Divine Mind. The Son is the Wisdom of God, as the Father is His Power and the Holy Ghost His Love, and the three constitute 'One Mind.' It is difficult to say what Tertullian originally meant when he first introduced the fatal term 'Persons' as the name for these distinctions within the Divine Mind, but it is evident the term 'Person' is now (in Augustine and St. Thomas) used in a very technical sense and a sense quite different from that in which it is used either in popular speech or in the language of

[7] Here are two illustrations of Origen's Christology:

'We say that the Logos was united and made one with the soul of Jesus in a far higher degree than any other soul, seeing that He alone was able completely to receive the highest participation in the true Word and the true Wisdom and the true Righteousness.' (*Contra Celsum* v, 39: Lommatzsch xix, 241).

'They see that from Him the divine and the human nature began to be united (lit. woven together) so that human nature might become divine by participation in the more divine, not in Jesus alone but also in all those who not only believe but also take up the life which Jesus taught.' (*Contra Celsum* iii, 28; Lommatzsch xviii, 27).

modern philosophy. It cannot be too emphatically asserted that, when traditionalists like Canon Mason, and even philosophical and rational theologians like Canon Peter Green, speak of the three 'Persons' of the Trinity as three minds or centres of consciousness and frankly deny that God is One Mind, it is they and not those whom they criticize who are heretics from the standpoint of Augustinian and scholastic orthodoxy. To St. Thomas, as to the ordinary modern philosopher, their position would have been Tritheism, pure and simple.

There is undoubtedly much in the fully-developed scholastic doctrine, and still more in the earlier theology out of which it grew, which is of no intrinsic value at the present day. All of it requires translation into the language of modern thought and some of it, it must be frankly confessed, almost defies such translation. The conception of the Logos taken by itself, apart from its Christian application, is one for which modern philosophy has no use. But that does not prevent our seeing in the fully-developed doctrine of the Person of Christ the expression in the language of a by-gone philosophy of that which still is — and, I believe, always will be — the central truth of Christianity, *viz.* that in the life and character, the teaching and the Personality of Jesus Christ the world has received its highest revelation of God, a revelation, however, which is still being continued and further developed by the work of God's Spirit in other human minds, and particularly in the society of Christ's followers.

That is, at bottom, I believe, what we mean when we speak of the Divinity of Christ. To justify the central position which it ascribes to Jesus in the religious history of the world would require an elaborate examination of the teaching and life of Jesus, and the comparison of His religion with other religions and other systems of religious and moral teaching. And yet after all the truth of such a conception could not be in the ordinary sense 'proved.' The truth of a moral ideal is a matter of immediate judgment. The doctrine of a supreme revelation of God in Christ must ultimately rest upon the affirmation of the moral consciousness that in its essential principles that moral ideal which is most fully incarnated in Christ's teaching and His life is still the truest and the highest that we know.

A LAY VIEW OF FASTING

By Margaret L. S. Missen, M.A.

A KNOWLEDGE of comparative religion and the findings of psychology and medicine have combined to put fasting in a new light. How far is fasting good or bad? May it any longer be regarded as a specifically *religious* practice? We may consider these questions under three heads :

(1) The attitude of Christ Himself. Did He advise or sanction fasting?

(2) Has fasting good or bad effect on character?

(3) Can fasting be definitely thought pleasing to God?

(1) Did Christ teach fasting as one of the essentials of the Christian religion? Those who maintain that He did like to point to the saying as given by St. Matthew, according to the Authorized Version (xvii, 21), 'But this kind' (of evil spirit) 'goeth not out save by prayer and fasting.' It is to be carefully observed that the Revised Version omits this verse as most doubtful, and that the parallel saying in St. Mark's Gospel (ix. 29) reads 'This kind can come out by nothing save by prayer.' On the whole, we may recognize that although Our Lord gave instructions about the method of fasting, He is never once said to have taught His disciples or other hearers to fast. The usual conclusion drawn is that He took fasting for granted as a part of religion. But advice or instruction on the best way of doing a thing is not necessarily equivalent to whole-hearted agreement that that thing is best done. It seems strange, to say the least of it, that Christ should be condemned by the orthodox religionists of His day for coming eating and drinking. He certainly could not have believed very strongly in the importance of the custom of fasting. It is quite possible that He may have disapproved, but thought it advisable not to say so when there were so many more serious misunderstandings to condemn. There is a limit to the courting of unpopularity when a revolutionary creed has to be preached. The prophecy that Christ's disciples would fast when He was gone most simply means that there was no point in indulging in it when He was with them. A teacher who be-

lieved strongly in the efficacy of fasting could hardly have given such lukewarm advice upon it to his inner band of followers.

Christ's own experience of fasting is described in the narratives of the Temptation. Psychology would say that the story is a pictorial presentation of His meditations and internal struggle. Some would say that Christ had visions, a thesis that abnormal psychology would endorse as the probable outcome of a long fast. Whatever interpretation of these narratives be correct, it is by no means obvious that His fasting better enabled Him to resist the temptations. Nor was Our Lord only tested then. 'The devil . . . departed from Him for a season,' and we are never told that He made a practice of fasting in order to overcome those temptations to which He was subject because He was 'in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.' He did not fast before Gethsemane; He resorted to the power of prayer. It is possible that with His insight and understanding of His own experience, He saw that weakness may come of fasts. A discipline that nerved a man to meet temptation may have been preferred by Him to a practice that heightens emotion and imagination without increasing control. Christ may have gone into the wilderness only because He could not otherwise obtain quiet. We know that the solitariness of nature was necessary to Him. It is noteworthy that afterwards, in the Lord's Prayer, He says, 'Lead us not into temptation,' which might well be interpreted as a strong warning against repeating His own experience of fasting.

The practice of fasting is an Eastern one. The fact that it was not peculiar to the Jewish people and is known outside the Biblical narratives really works in two ways. For we are at liberty to conclude that there must be something beneficial in fasting when many peoples have at times adopted it among their religious customs. On the other hand, if it is not peculiarly Christian, because it is not only Jewish, then why be overanxious to preach it as a doctrine of the Church? Even if Christ did advocate it, might not His advocacy have been due to His race, time and place, for in His humanity there is involved limitation, though not on the intuitional side? Certainly He is not dogmatic in His teaching on this matter. Our Lord was always reasonable in His outlook. He never blinded Himself

to factors which demanded consideration, but reached His conclusions through a comprehensive and balanced view. He was not likely to perform any religious exercise in a purely unthinking way. He Himself could not have been a mere follower of custom.

(2) Has fasting good or bad influence on character? This may be answered by asking, in the first place, Has fasting any real connection with spirituality?

The Eastern view is that the state of fasting is a state of holiness. The Buddhist monk or the Indian fakir are considered holy not because of any result which comes of the practice, but simply because they perform the act of fasting. The idea probably is that it takes strength of will to go without food; therefore people who deprive themselves of meat and drink strengthen the will. And where holiness is thought to be achieved by escape from this material world, fasting may seem a way of escape. But the visible result is not an increase of holiness. The result is diminished mental and physical fitness, and, perhaps, lowered spirituality. The results of fasting upon the clergy in the pulpit during Lent give any thinking worshipper to wonder, and cause distress and even revulsion among the more sensitive. Effectiveness in preaching is lessened through this lowering of personality. He would be a bold advocate indeed who could honestly say the value of sermons went up when the preacher fasted. It is not anaemia but health and fitness that give a clergyman maximum power in the pulpit, both in what he says and in delivery.

It is the Saints of the Middle Ages who have been chiefly responsible for the persistence of the Church's belief in the practice. Their doctrine was Neoplatonic in its inspiration rather than specifically Christian. Fasting with the Saints produced visions. But even if present-day conditions admitted of such personal attenuations as they practised, the Saints themselves would hardly have advocated fasting to procure visions for us. They not only emphasized prayer, duty and practical ministry as more important than the mere attainment of 'visions,' but we find among them recognition that visions can be of two kinds and are therefore hardly to be claimed as an indisputable sign of holiness. In this the Saints attained the standpoint of modern psychology without being aware of the physiological basis.

There is a tendency to connect fasting with a state of repentance for sin. But the Jewish custom of fasting was a sign, not a state, of repentance. The actual result of lack of food is rather apt to be a state of irritability and disharmony of temper which interferes with the soul's conversation with God. It is really a state predisposing to sin, for it alienates us from our fellows and may destroy the natural trust in a loving and providing God. The God who requires us to fast may come to seem inhuman in His wishes. Surely it is common experience that it is never possible to be so devout if one is tired or hungry as if one is feeling fresh and fit? Indeed, freshness and fitness themselves induce a grateful and more loving-kind attitude even towards God Himself. This attitude will issue spontaneously in praise. If anybody finds a connection between repentance and fasting, it can only be by a previous association of ideas. There may be then an induced emotional state. In that case another method would achieve the same result.

Fasting is primarily physiological in its effects. The practice is a refined form of self-immolation. It is therefore really an attempt at spirituality from a wrong standpoint: through mutilation rather than development of the personality It is chiefly advocated in our own day as a discipline in self-control. What kind of self-control is achieved by it? The natural reply would be self-control in eating and drinking. Does fasting really achieve this? The common experience of fasting seems to be that it results in strong reactions, and so defeats its end. Here the Church has been notoriously inconsistent in its teaching. It actually encourages feasting as well as fasting at certain times of the year, thus deliberately doing away with any possible benefit derived from the discipline of appetite through starvation. The undramatic truth is that the only way to achieve successful discipline in eating and drinking is to cultivate moderation, and at all times. Surely no harsher discipline than this proved and ancient one is necessary for men who occupy the place in society accorded the clergy in recognition of their moral standards? Yet the clergy, as everyone knows, are the people who do most of the fasting.

Modern psychology makes it clear that, at the best, nothing more than regulation of eating and drinking can be hoped of

the so-called discipline of fasting. All know that a person may be abstemious in meat and drink, yet be self-indulgent in quite different directions. The smoker who fasts from sweets is a case in point. In short, psychology shows that virtue practised in one direction does not necessarily affect us in another. We may even be benevolent in one direction and mean in another. Discipline must be of the whole personality and aim at increasing self-control. So far from increasing self-control of any kind, continued fasting lowers self-control in general by depleting the nervous energy.

It must be plainly said that fasting is positively harmful from the physiological point of view. The Roman Catholics know this and forbid fasting to children and nursing mothers. In its earlier stages fasting may result in an added sense of power. But this is deceptive. It is what is technically known in psychology as the first fatigue stage. The body is then drawing feverishly on its reserves of energy, and after that comes exhaustion or collapse.

Fasting is also to be questioned on religious and ethical grounds. Fasting really implies the exaltation, not of self-control, but of self-denial, as an end in itself. In this it is in keeping with the attitude of the brotherhoods and religious orders towards sex. There may be present also an un-Christian exaggeration of the importance of the will. An abstract will is exalted to be the supreme expression of life, and the positive virtues — even the highest, love for God and man — are sacrificed to encourage cultivation of sheer strength of will.

It is a common observance to substitute the eating of fish for meat as a mode of fasting. Why this should be so it is rather difficult to say. Some people prefer fish. Probably the original source of the custom was omission of meat from the many-coursed dinner of the better-off classes.

There is a manner in which mild fasting is beneficial, and probably this is at the root of the whole superstition. If we were to follow medical advice and eat less, most of the well-to-do would probably be healthier. But this is purely a matter of physical fitness, and it should be taken right out of the province of religion and be placed in that of medicine. It will then be the Church's duty to preach the cultivation of bodily fitness, under

medical direction, as the road to spiritual perfection in this world. It is very true that as the body is, so is the spirit.

(3) It is extraordinary that fasting should ever have been thought compatible with God's point of view. One can hardly imagine the Deity loving a Christian because he happened to be starving himself. Religion is of the spirit. It is therefore that many people do not like to associate the thought of fasting with Holy Communion. It seems derogatory to the spiritual loftiness of the rite. The Fatherhood of God has suffered from a detraction and lowering in many ways, not least, to our thinking, that He could view not only with equanimity but even with pleasure any of His children going without food. He that 'feedeth the hungry' can hardly be thought of as self-contradictory in His benevolence. We like to think of God the host and us His guests, not of a Being lacking in the first graces of humanity. We must avoid, as with the Atonement, doctrines of God which make Him sub-human in our desire to make Him different from ourselves. To be more than human is to be at least human.

'Thy body I gave thee. What has thou done with it?' Some such words as these might be our expectation at judgment. It is but a poor return for God's present bounty to think that we can disdain it. Fasting belongs to the cruder religions. Through revelation, and above all through the revelation in Jesus Christ, ideas advance and religion gains in nobleness and spirituality. To maintain this advance, we must cast off the imperfect beliefs of our childhood as a race, and gain higher and truer beliefs which are the fruits of a living and creative Holy Spirit of Love.

PERSECUTION OF HERETICS:
THE FIRST STAGE

By Francis S. Darwin, M.A., F.R.Hist.S.

THE relation of ecclesiastical laws against heresy and witchcraft to earlier imperial legislation on the same subjects, though known of course to students of law, is not realized generally. It is popularly supposed that it was the Church which initiated the persecution and punishment of the offenders in question; but the truth is that the first steps in this direction were

taken by the Eastern emperors, whose example the Church authorities in the West followed and developed at a later period. This article represents an attempt to set forth some of the evidence for this point of view.[1]

We start, inevitably, from the compilation known as the Corpus Juris (529-545 A.D.), made at the command of the Emperor Justinian — a compilation which includes, of course, many earlier laws. By an Imperial edict of 380 A.D. all heretics had been declared 'infames'—of ill repute, defamed[2]; from which would necessarily follow perpetual exclusion from office—'dignitates'—under the State, from service in the army, and even from recourse in certain cases to the law courts, not to mention other civil disabilities and loss of public rights; though such 'infamia' was *not hereditary*[3]—as it was made, to the third generation, by the Western Church and Empire in the thirteenth century.

> 'To those, whom "infamia" segregates from the company of the honourable, the doors of office will not be open.[4] . . . Such as have betrayed the Holy Faith, and by heretical superstition have profaned holy baptism, should be segregated from the company of all, be debarred from giving evidence, be incapable of making a testament, succeed to the heritage of none.'[5]

And, of all heretics, it is the Manicheans who figure oftenest as victims of the imperial displeasure. Thus:

> 'We desire it to be a public crime.[6] . . . Wherever Manichees are found, let them be capitally condemned.[7] . . . Let Manichees everywhere be expelled, and capitally punished: other heretics are forbidden to hold office, and to enjoy dignities: a Manichee, detected dwelling in Roman territory, should be beheaded.[8] . . . Let the Manichees, who have reached the lowest depth of wickedness, nowhere have the means of meeting and abiding on Roman soil: Manichees should be expelled from cities, and suffer the extreme penalty.[9] . . . A convert from Manicheism to Orthodoxy, if found given to his [former] error, living with or holding converse with Manichees, and not imparting instant information to a competent judge, is punished by the extreme penalty.'[10]

[1] Tanon, *L'Inquisition en France*, pp. 127-33, 460; 'De Cauzons,' *L'Inquisition en France*, i, pp. 160-72; Vacandard, *L'Inquisition*, pp. 9-13.

[2] *Codex* i. 1. 1. *Cf.* Archidiaconus, *Rosarium*, f. 181.r

[3] *Cf.* Greenidge, *Infamia*, pp. 38, 105, 155-63.

[4] *Codex* xii. 1. 2.

[5] *Ib.* i. 7. 3.

[6] *Ib.* i. 5. 4.

[7] *Ib.* 11.

[8] *Ib.* 12.

[9] *Ib.* 5.

[10] *Ib.* 16.

The last sentence is the first definite enunciation of the law of relapse, and the precedent for conciliar and papal legislation thereon later.

> 'We hold that capital punishment should be inflicted' on heretical propagandists perverting Christian free men to any 'nefarious sect or rite.'[11]

And Manichees may also have been aimed at by the threat that

> 'If any presume to deny the Resurrection or the Judgment. . . Our pleasure is that such persons be everywhere expelled, and suffer the extreme penalty.'[12]

Thus, under the later Roman Empire, death was inflicted for (1) persistence in, or relapse into, Manicheism; (2) any heretical propaganda. The only penalty definitely prescribed was decapitation; though that did not exclude burning and other brutal punishments, inflicted in that age on sacrilegious persons as well as on the lowest of criminals.[13]

There was, also, a formidable concomitant of the death penalty in the form of confiscation, which, moreover, accompanied even the loss of citizenship resulting from such punishments as deportation to an island or forced labour in a mine. Thus:

> 'Property is confiscated when either loss of life or of citizenship, or reduction to servile status, is inflicted.[14] . . . If a man be deported, he cannot have an heir; for he has lost his citizenship, and the treasury takes over his estate.[15] . . . A man condemned to the mines becomes a slave; and, for that reason, the goods of one suffering this sentence are claimed for the use of the treasury.[16] . . . Our pleasure is that Manichees lose all bequests or heritages falling to them by any title whatsoever; nor do we leave to those convicted any liberty of purchase donation or sale. . . We prosecute them with confiscation of all goods. . . Let their deaths be subject to an inquisition; for if, in the crime of treason, it is permitted to arraign the memory of the defunct, not undeservedly should such a one [as a Manichee] undergo a like judgment. Let, therefore, his last writing be void — whether by will, codicil, letter, or any other method, a convicted Manichee has left a testament behind him. The sons we permit not to be received as heirs, unless the paternal depravity has been abandoned by them — for to those repenting of their offence we grant pardon.[17] . . . Should some of the sons chance to be orthodox and communicants of the Catholic Church — while others are sundered therefrom — to the Catholic sons alone do we sanction the devolution of their parents' entire substance — albeit last wills may have been drawn by these, making therein some

[11] *Ib.* 7. 5.
[12] *Digest* 48. 13. 7-9.
[13] *Novellae* 146. 2; *Digest* 48. 13. 7.
[14] *Digest* 48. 20. 1.
[15] *Ib.* 5.
[16] *Codex* ix. 49. 4. *Cf. Ib.* 13. 3; Azo, *Summa* 957, 935. (ed. 1563).
[17] *Codex* i. 5. 4.

> disposition contrary to this our constitution. But should the separated brothers be converted, thereafter, to the Church, let a competent portion be assigned to them—'

the estate going to the Church only in default of orthodox agnates or cognates, and, in the last resort, to the treasury of the State only if not claimed by the Church.[18]

Thus by the imperial code the rights of orthodox children of heretical parents were carefully safeguarded against confiscation—as indeed was the case with innocent children, generally, in the case of other offences besides heresy:

> 'Since natural reason, like unto a silent law, would assign the heritage to the parents' children, it has seemed most equitable, where condemnation leading to punishment appropriates the estate of the parents, that account be taken of the children—lest, from no fault of their own, they pay too severe a penalty for the fault of another, through reduction to extreme poverty—a matter which it is Our pleasure should be settled with moderation; so that the rightful heirs to the whole may have portions granted therefrom—'

even if natural and adopted children, and to the extent of half the estate for children or grandchildren of a deceased deportee.[19] For, except in cases of treason, 'the crime or the punishment of a father can inflict no stain on the son'[20]—a pronouncement that rings, as it were, as a kind of anticipatory protest against the mediaeval enforcement of total confiscation of a heretical estate, even to the ruin of orthodox children, and against the Spanish requirement of 'limpieza,' or ancestral purity from heresy, in the case of applicants for office under Church or State—a pronouncement, too, which elicited from the sixteenth-century Spanish bishop and canonist, Simancas, the following observation:

> 'The aim of all this is kind and praiseworthy; but it is expedient for the State that the sons, also, of heretics should suffer from poverty—so that these old laws are deservedly abrogated, though there are not lacking some who think that to-day they should be observed.'[21]

Not only so, but in the imperial code the claims of creditors came before those of the State and its treasury, against which a twenty years' prescription sufficed, as against the prescription of forty and even a hundred years allowed by imperial law to the Western and the Roman Church respectively.[22]

[18] *Novellae* 115. 3. *Cf. Codex* i. 5. 15; Farinaccio, *Tractatus* 191. 29-31.

[19] *Digest* 48. 20. 7; *Codex* ix. 49. 10. *Cf.* Accursius on *Codex* 2128 (ed. 1575).

[20] *Digest* 48. 19. 26.

[21] Simancas, *Cath. Inst.* ix. 4.

[22] *Digest* 49. 4. 11; *Novellae* 9. 11; Azo 1266; Gratian, *Decretum* ii. 16. 4. 17; *Decretales* ii. 26. 8 and 13; Hostiensis, *Summa Aurea*, f. 140; Archidiaconus, *Ib.* f. 267^{v}; Vinagradoff, *Roman Law*, p. 53.

So it was that the laws codified by Justinian subjected a Manichee to loss of life and property. Henceforth it was obviously to the interest of the Church that the names Manichee, Cathari and Patarin should be regarded as convertible terms indicating practical identity of belief.

'Majestas,' or treason, was characterized by Ulpian as 'the crime nearest to sacrilege,' which itself came next to heresy: 'the crime of treason is that which is committed against the Roman people, or against its security'[23]:

> 'Whoso joineth in a criminal faction of soldiers, private persons, or barbarians, should be smitten by the sword — all his goods falling to Our treasury. . . Let his sons — to whom, with imperial lenity, we specially concede life — be held incapable of succession to the heritage of mother and grandfather, and of all their nearest kin; let nothing be received by them through testamentary disposition from others not akin to them; let them remain poor and needy, in perpetuity; let their father's infamy ever accompany them; let them attain to no honours whatever. . . Dowries, gifts and every sort of alienation we decree to be of no account — from the time when the parties aforesaid plotted their faction and conspiracy. . . To daughters a slender alimony is allowed—'[24]

a quarter of the mother's goods in mediaeval Castile[25]—

> 'for on those, the weakness of whose sex will prompt them less to such audacious acts, a more lenient sentence should be passed.'[26] . . . 'Decreed it was by the divine Severus and Antoninus that, from the time when a man has engaged in such a crime, he can neither alienate nor manumit, nor can a debtor legally pay him.'[27]

Similar pains were to be incurred by sons, accomplices and servants of conspirators.[28] Normally, under Roman law, 'the slave could not be examined in a matter which tended to incriminate his master'—except in cases of conspiracy.[29] But in a case of treason,

> 'The infamous[30] — who have not the right of accusing — are admitted to this accusation, and hearing is given even to slaves delating their masters and to freed men [delating] their patrons,'[31]

while, in a trial for this offence—'in which alone all are on the same level'[32] — torture might be inflicted on even free men.[33]

[23] Ulpian in *Digest* 48. 4. 1.
[24] *Codex* ix. 8. 5.
[25] *Siete Partidas* vii. 2. 2.
[26] *Codex, ib.*
[27] *Codex* ix. 8. 6.
[28] *Codex* ix. 8. 5.
[29] Greenidge, *Legal Procedure*, pp. 401-2. *Cf.* ***Codex*** ix. 41. 1.
[30] 'Famosi.'
[31] *Digest* 48. 4. 7 (Modestinus).
[32] 'In qua sola omnibus aequa conditio est.'
[33] *Codex* ix. 8. 4.

Into an act of treason an enquiry might be opened, after the death of the culprit;[34] and, unless it was 'purged,' or cleared, by his successors,[35] 'the memory of the defendant is condemned even after death.'[36] It was treasonable to show disrespect to the statues of the Emperor—though not so to repair them when dilapidated, or to hit them accidentally with a stone.[37] For students of inquisitorial procedure the importance of this draconian legislation against treason lies in the later, and not unnatural, inclination of popes, canonists and inquisitors to assimilate the treason of a rebel against an earthly monarch to the disloyalty, inherent in heresy, towards the heavenly Ruler, and to urge therefrom that the loss of life and property inflicted on traitors should, *a fortiori*, be extended to heretics. If disrespect to the statue of a mundane ruler entailed death and confiscation, how much more should these penalties result from an outrage committed against a crucifix, or against an image of the Heavenly King. From this point of view there was little that was new in certain essential features of the treatment meted out, later, to heretics by the western Church.

Other features of imperial legislation will be found to take on a new interest when viewed in the light of subsequent inquisitorial developments. A restricted use of torture is taken for granted—in at least the case of the unfree: 'In digging out[38] crimes'—a favourite phrase with Inquisitors—

> 'the question is usually applied. That torture be not resorted to at the outset, and that complete confidence be not reposed in it, was the counsel of the deified Augustus. . . By the constitutions it is declared that confidence should not always be reposed in, nor always be withheld from, the question; for it is a frail and dangerous thing — one which cheateth the truth.[39] For many, by their patience or power of endurance, exhibit such contempt for torture that the truth can by no means be wrung from them; whereas the lack of endurance characteristic of others is such that they will tell any lies rather than endure torture. To torture of slaves recourse should be had, in the end, when defendant is suspect, and when by other tokens proof is so nearly reached that the slaves' confession appears to be all that is lacking. . . That a freed man be not tortured against his patron is ordained — nor a brother against a brother. . . Since slaves should not be put to the

[34] *Ib.* viii. 9. 6.
[35] Ulpian in *Digest* 48. 4. 11.
[36] 'Lex Julia Majestatis' in *Institutes* iv. 18. 2.
[37] *Digest, ib.* 5.
[38] 'Eruere.'
[39] 'Etenim res est fragilis et periculosa, et quae veritatem fallat.'

question against their masters, much less should the evidence of slaves be admitted against their masters—this, by a rescript of Severus.[40] . . . A slave should not be interrogated, even if his master offer him for torture.[41] . . . To those under the age of fourteen the question should not be applied; but in a charge of treason — which touches the person of the prince — absolutely all[42] called on for evidence are tortured, when the case requires.[43] . . . Except when they are said to have taken part in the deed,[44] witnesses should not be tortured . . . The question can be repeated, in the case of a defendant overcome by evident proofs.'[45]

Such were the rules for guidance in the application of torture admitted to his legal compilation by Justinian. Needless to say, it was only in their *unrestricted* form — as applied, that is, to trials for treason — that they were taken over by the Inquisition.

For servants plotting against their master's life, persons guilty of arson within a town, traitors, deserters, parricides, coiners, and the sacrilegious, death by burning was admitted by Justinian.[46] Harbourers of criminals were to share the fate of the criminals,[47] a principle practically adopted by Gregory IX in his equation, in point of guilt, of Cathari 'Believers' with the 'Perfect.'[48]

'Let none consult soothsayer or mathematician — none a diviner. Let all curiosity of divination be hushed in perpetuity: whoso refuseth obedience to Our behests shall be smitten by capital punishment — be laid low by the avenging sword. . . All magicians should be deemed foes of the human race. A soothsayer who goes to another man's house should be burnt.'[49]

Except in cases of treason and coining, witnesses should be of good repute or position, and 'not ignoble artificers nor men of the humblest degree'[50] — a contrast to Inquisitors' indiscriminate admission of *any* witnesses, other than the deadly enemies of an accused. 'A man must not be stripped [of his goods] as soon as he is taken to prison, but only after condemna-

[40] *Digest* 48. 18. 1 (Ulpian).
[41] *Ib.* 18 (Paulus).
[42] 'Omnes omnino.'
[43] *Ib.* 10 (Arcadius).
[44] 'Facto intervenisse,' *i.e.* as accomplices.
[45] *Ib.* 18 (Paulus).
[46] *Digest* 48. 19. 2, 8, 11, 12, 27; *Codex* ix. 23. 1, *cf. Partidas* vii. 7. 10; Azo 931, 948; Panormitanus, *Commentaria* ii. 2, f. 140^{v}—'qui falsat monetam principis comburi debet.'
[47] *Codex* ix. 39. 1.
[48] Ripoll, I, p. 85 ('Excommunicamus,' 1231).
[49] *Codex* ix. 18. 3, 5, 7, *cf.* Accursius 2058.
[50] *Novellae* 90. 2, *cf.* Azo 333.

tion'[51]—a prohibition embodied by Boniface VIII in the Canon Law.[52] By special instructions given to governors, condemnation of anyone to perpetual fetters is prohibited;[53] for 'Imprisonment should be imposed for detention of men, not for their punishment'[54]—the fact being that it was entirely alien to Roman ideas to regard imprisonment as a definite punishment for crime.[55] What a contrast to the sentence of perpetual imprisonment in chains passed at times by a stern Inquisitor like Bernard Gui—a contrast which evoked from Bishop Simancas the comment:

> 'But by pontificial law imprisonment is used not only for custody but also by way of punishment; for, inasmuch as the sacred canons are unable to impose the death-penalty, they inflict the penalty of perpetual prison, lest grave offences should go unpunished—even as Cicero once, in his fourth oration against Catiline, said that perpetual fetters were devised as an extraordinary penalty for nefarious wickedness.'[56]

Lastly, by Roman Law, after delivery of the indictment, a defendant was to be allowed 'time for deliberation' as to his reply; whereas by the Spanish Inquisition he was expected to answer the Fiscal's 'Acusacion' on the spot and at once.[57]

Some of the more monstrous penalties, tolerated by even an enlightened ruler such as Justinian, made spasmodic and unseasonable reappearances far down the ages. As late as 1775 and 1781 witches were still executed in Germany and Spain respectively.[58] On December 5, 1820, under the Home Secretaryship of the hard and sanctimonious Sidmouth, Thomas Webb, bricklayer, a married man and father of four children, was hanged in London for 'sacrilege'—in this case the theft of a surplice and some black cloth from Enfield church.[59] The sense of pity is of tardy growth; was not more than a frail shoot till a hundred years ago, and is yet not well established.

[51] *Digest* 48. 20. 1.
[52] *Decretales* vi. 5. 2. 19.
[53] *Digest* 48. 19. 35 (Callistratus).
[54] *Ib.* 8 (Ulpian), *cf. Codex* ix. 47. 6.
[55] Greenidge, *Legal Procedure*, p. 514.
[56] Simancas, *Enchiridion* lvii. 2.
[57] Garcia, *Orden de Processar*, f. 15r; *Digest* xi. 1. 5.
[58] Kittredge, *Witchcraft*, p. 570 (1928).
[59] *The Times*, December 6th, 1820.

THE RE-INTERPRETATION OF SACRIFICE

By the Rev. Marcus Knight, B.A., B.D., Priest-Vicar of Exeter Cathedral.

'THERE is probably no subject on which our ordinary ideas need a more drastic revision than on the meaning of sacrifice.'[1] These are not the words of any destructive critic, but of Dr. E. J. Bicknell, who was the last person to call for drastic revision unless it was really needed. The word 'sacrifice' is, however, so charged with intense religious significance in the minds of many, and conveys so rich a variety of meaning, that any suggestions in the direction of revision must be in a large measure of an individual nature. One has to ask oneself the question, 'What does sacrifice mean to me? More especially, how can I understand any doctrine which speaks of the death of Christ as a sacrifice for sin, and any doctrine of the Eucharist which describes it in sacrificial terms?'

Without doubt some assistance is to be gained by a study of sacrifice in primitive religion, and a book such as that by Dr. E. O. James on the subject is very illuminating. Sacrifice is a religious custom, a transaction with the holy, a response to those elements in human experience which drive man to a realization of his creaturehood before ultimate forces which he cannot control. It is reasonable to think that early man practised sacrifice in the belief that it had something to do with his food supply. Karl Marx was probably right in asserting that there is an economic background to all man's endeavour, and it was this which drove him to take note of those powers which had some control over his food supply. He could not acquire an adequate harvest without their friendly co-operation, for they were responsible for those elements which he could not control — rain, sunshine and storm — and he was forced to recognize the existence of the uncanny and the mysterious. From the first, then, religion had to do with life, physical and spiritual. The first element in sacrifice must have been to secure life more abundant, conceived of chiefly in physical terms. If, later, the harvest turned out well, man would be thankful, and in this aspect sacri-

[1] *Introduction to Thirty-nine Articles*, p. 107.

fice would be eucharistic. Thus our Harvest Festivals would be in the nearest relation to these early sacrifices, and their popularity due to the chord they strike in even the most primitive and unspiritual hearts. The fact that the result was so good must have been because of the co-operation of the gods and men, and the sacrifice would be shared between the two in a communion festival, with hosts and guests around a common board. If crops were bad and things went wrong, it was felt that the human side had failed somewhere, and the trouble arisen from the known or unknown sins of the people. Someone had blundered, or deliberately rebelled, and a sacrifice of propitiation would be required before the old friendly relations could be again established. The more serious the offence, the greater the value of the offering required. The very strong sense of tribal unity meant that good and evil were predicated less of the individual than of the group 'Your sins are my sins, and my sins are your sins,' was a stern truth to them. Religion was a group matter, and the group was knit together, and to its deity, in a rigid external way by what was believed to be a covenant of the most sacred kind. Such a covenant was sealed by bloodshed, which meant that life was released to flow in the being of both parties to the solemn relationship. At the same time, no covenant was merely external, and it involved moral obligations the breaking of which would involve the termination of any benefits promised under the original contract.

Gradually two things happened. The individual emerged as solitary and unique, although still a member of a community and the sense of sin grew more personal and more inward. For the Hebrews, the tribal god began to be conceived of as the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, whose primary demand was righteousness and truth in the inward parts. For a time perhaps these two elements persisted together, the old system and the new, and Psalm 51, if it is a unity, might suggest that the two were not felt to be incompatible. Nevertheless, the coming of the new did make the existence of the old no longer necessary, and religion could persist without the external ordinances which had always so far been the mode of its expression. In the light of the Revelation of God in Jesus Christ the whole weight was changed and all emphasis was laid upon the new inner relationship of every individual with God, and the Christian belief

was that religion was a relationship of a personal kind between God, man, and man's neighbour, with the aim of that fellowship becoming deeper through love. Clearly the previous sacrificial system had conserved and guarded the earliest manifestations of this truth long before it ever became so clear, but much of the terminology and thought and practice became obsolete when this higher stage had been reached, just as scaffolding is no longer necessary when the full beauty of a building becomes visible and it stands in its own strength. The confusion in the minds of many over the question of sacrifice has arisen because the scaffolding has not been cleared away sufficiently for them to separate the structure from those early conceptions which had enabled it to be built up in the first place. Conservatism has conserved too much, as it has done in other fields of religion.

If this is a true analysis of the situation, the next step is to see how it affects the way in which one will think about the Atonement. The early Christians, with their Jewish background, naturally used the whole sacrificial terminology in order to explain reasonably what they knew had taken place in their experience. They thought of God in a close covenant relationship with His people, and of this relationship as having been broken by sin, corporate and individual. Only someone from God could adequately represent humanity to God, and as the head of all the group represent them, go between them and their due reward, and submit in a substitutionary way to the penalty of sin. The view is built up on two strong emphases, on sin and on the close-knit group. Hence words such as 'Christ was made sin' suggest how He stood at the head of and in the place of sinful humanity. The whole early Christian theology, familiar to us all, is only able to convey much meaning if those two emphases are retained. The difficulty is that the emphasis has changed from the group to the individual, and from the sense of sin to worship, or valuation, of which the sense of sin is a secondary product. Thus, instead of working from the group to the individual, we have to proceed now in the opposite direction, and we cannot presume on a sense of sin until we have built up the realization of an 'other' over against whom we see ourselves to be sinful.

As an individual contemplates the character and being of God, he feels that the true relationship with God which he

should enjoy is imperfect or spoilt, and can only be restored by God. God must set forth to the uttermost His willingness to forgive and to reconcile the sinner with Himself, and this He does in the Cross. If the sinner can be made to realize that God so wills to restore him, that creates the possibility of his improvement. Much of Our Lord's teaching lays stress on this characteristic of God, notably the parables of the lost sheep, the lost coin, and the prodigal son. It is an individual theory, and will always mean most to individualists, so that it is natural that it appealed so greatly to Abelard. The sacrifice of Christ is a convincing display of the love of God for even the worst of men, and the hymn 'When I survey the wondrous Cross' fully sums up its challenging appeal. There can be no doubt that it is this appeal which is most attractive to-day, when the emphasis is so much laid upon the individual in his own personal relation with God. Christ, in utter devotion to His Father's will, loved His own more than His life, and when men know how much has been given for them, they will give much in return.

On the other hand, man is a member of society, and it is society which has made him in many ways what he is, and the situation for good or evil into which he is born is one for which society is responsible. It is this fact which the supporters of the 'objective theory' will not let go. They do not believe merely that society is made up of a number of separate individuals, but that in some measure there is a real sense in which society actually constitutes individuals. It seems as if there is a way in which it is as true to say that there are no individuals without society as that there is no society without individuals. But of the two it seems that the ultimate unit, on the Christian view, is the individual, and everyone has to go through his own repentance and experience before he makes any difference to his group. *I* am society, and the Kingdom of Heaven has to be in *me* first of all. All the old Covenant terminology conveyed meaning because it was felt that God dealt with society before He dealt with individuals. Even if that order is reversed, it remains true that God is a God of society as of individuals. It is true, then, that 'the lamb of God taketh away the sin of the world,' although the phraseology is confusing, for 'lamb' suggests qualities which are not the most heroic, 'taketh away' is a materialistic way of describing an intensely inward and personal

experience on the part of the individual in his response to Christ, and 'sin' is an abstraction. What really happens is a dealing with sinners by God, a matter of personal relations rather than external action. Sacrifice is the natural response of the redeemed group to the offering of Christ of His own personal life, with all its qualities, in complete devotion to God, in extreme worship of the supremely good. A group of such persons, who even feebly are in union with the offering of Christ, are in a peculiar relation to Him which is described as 'being in His Body,' and thus united with Him in the atoning sacrifice. Thus they are in the New Covenant, or related to God in a new and special way, which can only be realized through this union with Christ's mind and purpose to which all may come who have responded to His appeal and calling. This group is the Church, 'the blessed company of all faithful people,' and ideally it is the true sacrificial body, for it offers this devotion and spends itself in service in order that the appeal of God's love in Christ may be made clear to those who are as yet outside its privileges and its responsibilities. This appeal is mediated by lives of consecration and saintliness, as yet incomplete but always becoming more nearly so. Society is through and through affected by this living activity of sacrifice by the Church.

Yet there is more than the Church, for the life and death of Christ in some way do affect the 'whole world.' This truth indicates that those events were of a value and significance of a unique and peculiar kind to all men for all time, and that when they do know of them, everything will be affected by comparison with the new standard, and nothing can ever be again as it was before. In other words, it is a radically different world A.D. from what it was B.C., and it is not unreasonable to speak of there having been a new creation, especially in the field of personal relations and in the understanding of man's origin, destiny and mode of living. There is a new way, and new truth, and a new life, and if men realize this, and think again and turn to it, then they align themselves with the forces of goodness in the creative task of building the world anew, and so 'fill up that which was lacking in the sufferings of Christ' (to use St. Paul's phrase) by their unity with Him in that task. Sacrifice is the activity of persons, the essential accompaniment of utter devotion to that which is valued as utterly good. The Cross would always then

be thought of as a supreme act of worship, of the offering of the perfect Son of Man to the perfect personality of God. His perfect devotion consecrates all the feeble offerings of those who are in unity of spirit with Him, and this same sacrifice is the supreme appeal and challenge to all men always.

The thought of the Atonement naturally leads on to that of the Eucharist, for the two are closely connected. In what sense may we speak of that as a sacrifice? The terminology which has been associated with the Eucharist has been that of primitive sacrifice. It has been regarded as the commemoration of the sealing of a sacred and new covenant by the shedding of blood. It has been looked upon as a memorial of 'one perfect oblation, sacrifice and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.' It is still looked upon as a pleading of that sacrifice before God in union with Him who ever liveth to make intercession for us. The communion is made with the symbols of the sacrificed body and blood of Jesus Christ, who gave them that so men might have eternal life.

In translating this terminology into that of personality, with the emphasis on worship as the basis of sacrifice, we should insist that the Eucharist is a transaction between personal beings, God, myself, society. The 'remembrance' aspect is one which needs no explanation. Everyone who buys a poppy on November 11th is doing something in remembrance of a sacrifice which was offered because men thought that some cause was worth even the offering of their lives. The sacrifice of Christ is the ideal type of all such offerings, and there is no doubt about the value of His object of devotion. The title 'Eucharist' recalls another aspect of sacrifice, and a very primitive one: the sacrifice of thankfulness and praise. The 'Communion' is the sharing in union of spirit with the offering of Christ, the receiving to oneself of those qualities in His life which resulted from the complete devotion which was His to the will of His Father. We are brought into that same attitude of worship, to share in that same devotion, to show forth in our lives those qualities which were shown perfectly in His. So we are joined with that group of persons who are linked together by a common object of worship, by a calling to share in a task which must be the co-operative effort of all. In this sense we may think of Christ as our 'propitiation,' in that as the head of the group, of 'His body,' God

sees us not as we are but as we intend to become in His strength within that group. Salvation becomes a social matter, even if it is primarily individual. The task to which this faithful group is called is to reconcile the world, those outside the group, to God by sharing in the work of atonement, which proceeds so long as there are those who are strangers to their true life and devoted to false and illusory values. The faithful community are the priests of humanity, bearing its sins, making stronger its feebleness, and offering to God not its realized futility but its great aspirations.

The reflection to which these fragmentary ideas have brought us is that sacrifice will mean most if it is thought of in terms of personal relations and as an aspect of worship. Sacrifice is an element in the pursuit of the vision of God, a necessary accompaniment of all perfect devotion to the good, and essential to that satisfaction. Dr. Grenfell of Labrador is reported to have replied once to a man who commented upon the sacrifice he had made in order to spend his life there, 'Sacrifice! I don't know what you mean. It has been all joy.' The two thoughts from the New Testament which would mean most to us are that 'God was in Christ reconciling the world to Himself,' and that Our Lord, 'for the joy set before Him, endured the Cross.' Sacrifice, as Bishop Westcott said, is 'the response of love to love,' and we can only love God because He first loved us, and offer ourselves to Him because He offered His love to us.

No sacrifice is of avail unless it is 'holy, reasonable, and living.' Holy in the sense that it is the best that can be offered; reasonable because no religious practice can long survive sustained intellectual condemnation; living because all our religion is personal fellowship between personal beings. If the old terminology has lost its meaning, or fails to attract the minds and emotions of men to-day, it is because it does not make clear to them that sacrifice involves holiness, reason, and everyday life. At its best the Jewish sacrificial system was able to do this, but it does so no longer. For us the emphasis must be on worship and personal relationship, and perhaps its essential meaning is most completely summed up in the response to the Sursum Corda, 'Lift up your hearts; We lift them up unto the Lord.' That is our reasonable sacrifice.'

BOOK REVIEWS

GREAT CHRISTIANS*

(By a Roman Catholic Reviewer.)

Great Christians is a mixed bag of Roman Catholics, members of the Church of England, Nonconformists and free-lances. We opened it with a feeling of great curiosity, anxious to find out if there was any notable feature that all these great Christians possessed in common, whereby to justify their common right to the proud title bestowed upon them. We ended by applying three tests.

(1) Would Jesus Christ have acknowledged them all? The whole forty? Emphatically, yes.

(2) Then we tried Simon Peter — a more difficult test, as there is less evidence to rely on. Still, how did Simon Peter meet Paul, Paul with his strange new talk, his Modernism as we should call it in these days, but likewise his burning love for the Master? Yes, St. Peter would have accepted the whole of them for the same reason that he gave to St. Paul 'the right hand of fellowship.' One and all they were great lovers of Jesus Christ and in His name they one and all wrought that greatest of all miracles, the miracle of a life of absolute devotion to the things of the Spirit and the loving service of their fellow-men.

(3) The third test failed. What would Rome say to them? How many of them would she recognize?

Only two, and they rather doubtful: Lord Acton and Baron F. von Hügel. Why has the ecclesiastical standard become so much more narrow and exacting than that of either Jesus Christ or His chief Apostle?

Three of the forty were members of the Roman Catholic Church. Of these, only two, Lord Acton and Baron von Hügel, died in the Communion, after a long period of strenuous opposition to the authorities. But when it came to a choice between submission, and what they both of them feared more than death itself — deprivation of all the helps and privileges of Catholic fellowship — they gave way. Opinions may vary as to the value of their subsequent, somewhat fulsome professions of adherence to what they had formerly whole-heartedly denounced. Conversions under torture are suspect.

The third Roman Catholic, George Tyrrell, who, as his friend the Abbé Bremond said of him, feared nothing but the shadow of a lie, held his ground and died excommunicated.

No one doubts that in all Lord Acton did before and during the Vatican Council he was actuated by zeal for the Truth. His knowledge of Church History was stupendous. His fears and those of the Minority Bishops were not unreasonable. We must remember that, judged by the old tradition, that Bishops in Council represent and declare the faith of their flocks — the Minority were really the Majority. The Majority, so-called, was merely a numerical episcopal majority largely composed of titular Bishops, with no flocks to represent. Fear of schism '*L'affreux schisme*' as Duchesne calls it — dominated the so-called Minority, who were also a Majority if judged by weight of character and learning. Fr. Butler remarks (p. 24) that the great fear of Acton and the Minority Bishops was 'that the defining of

* *Great Christians*. Edited by R. S. Forman. (Ivor Nicholson and Watson. 1933. Price 8*s*. 6*d*.)

Papal Infallibility would turn the Catholic Church into a veritable theocracy.' He adds complacently 'the actual results after sixty years have shewn that such forebodings have not materialised.' This is the sort of remark that intelligent Roman Catholic lay people recognize as made in good faith in the interests of edification. Still, there are a few of us who are unreasonable enough to feel that a little candour at times would be even more edifying than direct attempts at edification.

The Council left the Episcopate shorn of their ancient rights. They are now sons of the Pope — his children, in fact, as much as are the laity. The words *Primus inter Pares* are now quite meaningless: so much for the position of the Episcopate. As for the laity, they simply do not count at all in the government of the Church. All that is expected of them is to obey and to pay. And yet the great body of the Faithful is the seed-bed, as it were, of inspiration and progress. And Newman warns us that not to advance is to corrupt and die. As if to justify his warning, a rather loathsome religious devotion to the person of the Pope is growing up unrebuked among both clergy and laity, as if His Holiness really were a re-incarnation of Jesus Christ like the Dalai-Llama is supposed to be of the Buddha, which is inexpressibly repulsive to the saner members of our Church. Tyrrell was keenly alive to this unpleasant tendency — what he called the deification of the Pope. Slowly but surely the centre of gravity in the Roman Catholic Church is shifting from Jesus Christ to the Pope. Salvation depends on submission to him. Very little value is attached to the most sublime and Christian virtue, if it is tinged by the faintest shade of what is called 'disloyalty' to the Pope.

Well might Tyrrell groan and ask: 'Will Rome destroy the Church?' Well might the tortured priest Hébert, when Rome's representative offered him his services on his death-bed, cry out, pointing to a large picture of Christ that hung in his room: 'Va-t en, je m'arrangerais tout seul avec celui-la.'

Rome still gathers in recruits in large numbers, good ordinary souls, intelligent on many matters except religion, who are thankful that their salvation is assured by a Church that offers them what no other Church does — complete safety and release from personal responsibility, at the price of unquestioning submission.

Freedom of thought and speech has been stamped out in the Roman Catholic Church as effectually as in Fascist Italy or Soviet Russia. Well might Baron von Hügel in his old age 'sacrifice himself,' as he humbly says, to make 'the old Church as habitable intellectually as I can' (p. 276). He hastens to add that in spiritual matters she has nothing to learn, of course. In earlier years he would have been instant in his protests that where there is no freedom for the mind, the soul has small chance of developing spiritually.

Yet every great Roman Catholic is loyal to the Papacy as an institution. What Acton, von Hügel and Tyrrell in their various ways longed for was a reformed Papacy, with a Pope of wide and modern culture and great spiritual insight, who should be able to free himself from the vicious traditions of the Curia. As things are, the new Pope is always an Italian. The Italian Cardinals being always a large majority, the Curia controls the election and of course subsequently the Italian Prelate it elects. Tyrrell was haunted by the fate of the Jewish Church.

Acton and von Hügel each retired from the fray to spend their remaining years in practices of piety and, in the case of the Baron, in teaching and preaching (he was half Scotch and preaching was natural to him) the perfectly safe and innocuous, but not specifically Christian, doctrine, of the

objective reality and otherness of the Deity. He wisely left the real problems that are of life and death moment to the religious world severely alone. His intellectual interest in mysticism was always very great, especially in religious pathology. That he was a mystic himself may be doubted. The real mystic seldom philosophizes much on the nature of transcendent Deity. He is wrapt in the ecstatic realization of man's (his own, usually) oneness with God, so much so that he is nearly always, and most unfairly, accused of pantheistic tendencies. He can only know God experimentally by way of love, and love is a unitive virtue.

Of Dr. Major's paper on Tyrrell we can only say that all Tyrrell's friends must be grateful for so understanding and sympathetic a presentation of his life and aims.

As we turn over the pages of the remaining sketches we are conscious of an extraordinary charm, as of a succession of musical variations on the one great theme. As the Archbishop of York says of their subjects in his Foreword:

> 'indefinitely various in ecclesiastical and temperamental type, but alike in the fact that through Faith in Christ, they became illustrations of the greatness that is possible to men.'

There is the Plymouth brother and mystic Frank Crossley, the commercial genius, who built up a huge business and yet contrived to treat his clients, when in misfortune, in their own words, 'As Jesus Christ would have treated me.' Should we have strikes and industrial wars if there were more Frank Crossleys? Is it not possible that there is truth in the lines?

> 'Oh, Christ, if there were no hereafter
> It yet were best to follow Thee.'

There is Dale, the Congregationalist Minister, who, when told somewhat sharply by a Roman Catholic priest friend to quit politics and look after his soul, replied:

> 'I have given my soul to Christ to look after. He can do it better than I can. My duty is to do His Will and to leave the rest to Him.'

There is Dolling, the Anglo-Catholic and lover of souls, who seems to have shared Tyrrell's impatience of great seriousness over small matters, which is perhaps a failing of ecclesiastics in high position all the world over:

> 'They both loved the souls of men with a consuming fire and wanted to rescue them, the former from the degradation of slum life, the other from intellectual unbelief. . . The name Catholic was honey on their lips and so was the gospel of Christ' (p. 181).

Nothing mattered but the souls of men to either of them. Dolling used everything he could lay hands on if it served the main purpose of his life, whether or no authorities approved. Tyrrell let authorities do their worst and strip him of everything he cared for in life, sooner than utter one word that could be misunderstood by 'those who have trusted me.'

It is impossible to mention them all. There is the world-famous scholar and Bishop, Westcott, whose epitome of his own life is summed up in his almost dying words to the miners of his cathedral city of Durham:

> 'I have sought to tell you what I have found in a long, laborious life to be the most prevailing power to sustain right endeavour, however imperfectly I have yielded myself to it — even the love of Christ. . . I have given you a watchword which is fitted to be the inspiration, the test and the support of untiring service of God and man — the love of Christ constraineth us' (p. 588).

Intensely interesting as well as beautiful is the religious philosophy of John Theodore Merz, the great Tyneside industrialist. Of German origin, he fled from the 'cant of some Protestants and the dogmatic intolerance of Roman Catholics' as well as from the arrogance of German 'higher thought' in the 'sixties to a quiet Quaker Society on Tyneside. He never became a Quaker, as he held that it is sometimes right to fight, but he worshipped with them. He helped to build Armstrong College and was a lifelong encourager of industry and education. He also found time for a great work on the History of Thought. He was a man of immense learning. It is quite impossible to give a still shorter account of Merz's religious philosophy than is given in Canon Newsom's paper, and that is far too long to quote. Merz leaves the question of miracles and theology severely alone. He had had enough of the latter in early life. All social and moral order, he says, is founded on, or restored by, the influence of great personalities. At a certain point in history a mysterious and unique Personality appeared who in His own Person raised to the level of a great Reality all those ideals of a moral and spiritual life which had appeared in various forms in pre-Christian times without being able to establish themselves. Through Him God has revealed to the world the Perfect Law of Love which is the deepest meaning of the Universe in which our experience is set. Merz should be read by everyone interested in the History of the Origins and Development of Christianity, not so much for the facts, as for the vision with which Merz interprets their meaning. In early life Merz had been brought to a realization of the vital truth of Christianity by the words 'Come unto Me ye that are weary and heavy laden and I will refresh you.' Had Christ, he felt, been just one man among others, He could not have said these words, and if He had said them no one would have come, and if they had come He could not have given them rest. This conviction never left him. In his old age he summed up his thought in explaining (a favourite theme) 'how the child first comes to consciousness of his self through perceiving the regard that his mother bends upon him.' 'Just so,' he added, 'humanity looked up into the Face of Jesus Christ and found itself.' All its unrealizable dreams came true in Him. Did not Origen say, 'In Christ the pagan myths become true.' How did you know that Hercules was a God? Because my eyes were content when they rested upon him.

Merz insists that the original fount of spiritual life that fed Christian civilization is still unexhausted.

We come now to Hale White, better known as 'Mark Rutherford,' whose life was set in a minor key. His own outside world and the world in which characters in his books lived was unspeakably drab. His period and his surroundings were Philistine. But he himself was neither drab nor Philistine, but full to the brim of human tenderness and sympathy and insight, without a trace of sentimentality. He is like a man deprived of one sense—say, sight—and we watch with amazement the patient courage with which he faces his life and the way the other senses make good the deficiency. At last the goal is reached and the lack of sight no longer matters. It has turned into a blessing in disguise for himself and others. There is something of Merz's attitude in his final stage in *The Deliverance*. He raises his eyes to the face of Jesus Christ and finds himself—without trying to define the undefinable. For times of temptation he says: 'I had no doubt as to what He would have done and through Him I did not doubt what I ought to do.' Mark Rutherford sent all his books to George Tyrrell, and in one of them Tyrrell has pasted a pressing invitation he received from Mary Rutherford to come and spend a long day with him in his garden at Groombridge.

There is no space in which to deal with the other characters of this volume. Wives and mothers, young men keen to do Christ's work among their fellow-men and to whom in many cases the Great War brought the opportunity they sought. Many triumphant believers, and we meet them all, on the whole a very joyous band, on the high road of life in its noon-day dust and heat, without a thought of world-flight.

A MODERNIST LEADER.*

In a little volume, under a hundred pages, Professor Percy Gardner, a greatly revered leader of English Modernism, in a clear and simple outline, places on record the main experiences of his life, particularly in reference to the academic and religious movements in England during the last half-century.

This volume, which is very pleasantly printed, falls into five sections. The first deals with its author's ancestry and school days. He was sprung, on his father's side, from a family of 'town-dwellers in Essex, Liberals in politics and Congregationalists in religion.' His mother's family contributed a different strain; her grandfather and father were sailors. We cannot forbear citing two delightful vignettes of his maternal uncles:

> 'The elder, Francis Pearse, a London merchant in a small way, gave the whole of his leisure time during a long life (he lived to 96) to the reading of great literature in English, French, German and Italian, and amassed an amazing amount of learning, which, as he neither wrote nor lectured, perished with him. But he was useful in keeping up a high intellectual standard in a small coterie of friends, who looked up to him with reverence. The younger of the two, George Pearse, was at the opposite pole. He was a devoted and ardent Christian, at one time a Plymouth Brother. For a time he was a member of the Stock Exchange; but in middle life he abandoned it to go as an evangelist to France and Algeria, a mission in which he found moderate success, but great happiness. He was indeed the happiest man I ever knew. Though he lost successively his charming wife, and all his children, and nearly all his worldly goods, nothing could ever damp his hopefulness, or diminish his trust in the goodness and the leading of God. So he seemed to radiate happiness on everyone who came in contact with him, and we children loved him beyond measure. If one brother was incarnate intellect, the other was incarnate religion and kindliness' (p. 2).

Early in life his father set out to seek his fortune in London, and finally achieved it as a leading member of the London Stock Exchange. In 1846, the subject of the autobiography was born. Like a number of other distinguished Victorians, he was a pupil of the City of London School. J. R. Seeley was his form-master. For him he wrote a Latin essay on the nature of truth in which its author perceives in retrospect the seed of his later Pragmatism. He left school at fifteen and entered his father's stock-broking office and daily walked four miles into the city and often walked back again at night. His annual holiday lasted for a fortnight and was spent at the seaside. Yet he found time to read and write. He composed 'a long poem on the siege of Damascus by the Mohammedans' written

> 'on scraps of paper when I was waiting in offices for an interview, or impressed on my memory as I walked. History and philosophy, Homer and Euclid, occupied my mind almost as much as the details of business.'

* *Autobiographica*. By Percy Gardner, Litt.D. (Basil Blackwell. 1933. Price 3/-.)

It is not surprising that, although extremely diligent, conscientious and punctual in the discharge of his duty, he began to recognize, as did his father, that he was not cut out to be a successful business man.

In 1865 he went up to Christ's College, Cambridge — the college of Milton, Cudworth and Darwin. An inspiring expansion of his horizon ensued. Yet he feels on looking back that he made a mistake in selecting Cambridge rather than Oxford, as his bent was philosophical, aesthetic and literary, not scientific and mathematical. He obtained a first in the Classical Tripos, although he disliked the somewhat jejune methods of classical study as they were pursued in Cambridge at that time. His real interest was in philosophy, and he obtained a first class in the Moral Science Tripos, being placed at the head of the list. In 1872 he obtained a Fellowship at Christ's. He came early under the influence of the Positivism of Comte and has never ceased to be his disciple in some spheres, though not in those which are most characteristically positivist. He had been brought up in a deeply religious home, and he notes that when at Cambridge

> 'I was never disposed to give up the principles of Christianity and the life of the spirit.'

He writes:

> 'To my parents religion was the great interest of life, the power which lifted them above the level of suburban existence,'

and there is little doubt that for their son the world of spiritual reality has always been the supreme thing in his experience. He occasionally attended the lectures of F. D. Maurice, 'which were ethically very stimulating.' In 1870 he came into closer contact with him, and under his influence he became a confirmed member of the Church of England. Of Maurice he writes:

> 'I suppose I was nearer to his position than to that of any other Cambridge cleric. But his mind and mine were quite differently organized. I had great difficulty in following his expositions, and I do not think that he quite understood my difficulties. . . I never became a disciple of Maurice, highly as I appreciated his breadth and his spirituality. . . Certainly my own mind demanded something more definite and clear-cut. . . Although I felt that the love of God was his principle of life, yet that love had to be brought into relations with the perspicacity of Mill and even of Mansel.'

In 1871 he found his real vocation—classical archaeology. This came to him in the form of a post in the Department of Antiquities at the British Museum. Here he spent sixteen years, 'a wonderful haven of peace and solid work.' Here he became the first editor of the *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, which he raised to a very high level, and gained a European reputation as an authority on Hellenic coinage and art. He states that since 1871 'I have every year published some book or paper on coins and other productions of the Greeks.' Of the *Journal* he writes that

> 'neither editor nor authors of papers were paid: it was a work of love, and therefore carried on with enthusiasm.'

In 1905 he became President of the Hellenic Society. In 1880 he was elected to the Disney chair of Archaeology at Cambridge and in 1887 vacated it for the Lincoln professorship of Classical Archaeology in the University of Oxford and at first lived in John Wesley's rooms at Lincoln College. In Oxford he found open to him

> 'a great field for the establishment of a school of archaeology. In that field I worked for thirty-eight years with satisfaction.'

He strove to teach his pupils to appreciate the quality and significance of the objects of classical art possessed by the Ashmolean: their place in the evolution of art, with an adequate conception of the historic background which produced them. He succeeded in making classical archaeology an important element in the school of *Literae Humaniores*, which he calls 'the best existing school of education in the world,' but regrets

> 'It does not inculcate that "fanaticism of veracity" which Huxley regarded as the basis of intellectual honesty.'

In 1925 he resigned his professorship, having given personal instruction to 757 men and 129 women, many of whom to-day occupy important posts in the learned world.

But Jerusalem, as well as Hellas, had its claim on Professor Gardner. We have already noted his strong religious bent, but the Professor is no believer in the saying *pectus facit theologum*. He regards a sound knowledge of the psychology and philosophy of religion and the principles of historical criticism as also needful for true theology. It was no mere matter of predilection for theological studies which prompted him to take them up. He writes:

> 'There had always been with me a conviction, at first half-conscious, but becoming clearer with time, that I had a duty in the matter. I saw how the outward form of Christian belief among us was out of date and inadequate, how religion was wrapped in the clothes of a bygone time, and how for that among other reasons it was losing its hold on the rising generation . . . The intellectual inadequacy of of Christian thought is a very powerful stimulus to revolt, especially in the more highly educated.
>
> 'The form of Christianity among us needs to be brought into harmony with the results of science and research, and adapted to the modern intellectual atmosphere.'

He published anonymously his first theological work, *Faith and Conduct*, in 1887. His theological *magnum opus*, *Exploratio Evangelica*, appeared in 1899. This work excited profound admiration and trenchant criticism and gave its author a foremost place among English historical theologians. Then followed in 1901 his extremely lucid and concise *A Historic View of the New Testament* and his even more valuable *The Growth of Christianity* in 1907, which he was prohibited from delivering in Bow Church by the Bishop of London. Many more theological works followed, two of the greatest interest being *Religious Experience of St. Paul* in 1911 and *The Ephesian Gospel* in 1915. His theological works were consummated by the publication of *Modernism in the English Church*, *Christian Ethics*, and *The Interpretation of Religious Experience*.

This theological library, for it is nothing less, constitutes a very remarkable contribution by one writer, and he himself a notable teacher, authority, and publicist in another great department of learning. In a review of this kind we can include no adequate appreciation or criticism of Professor Gardner's contributions to religious study. Modernists know how much they owe not only to his writings but also to his personal influence. He was President of the Modern Churchmen's Union from 1914 to 1923 and has been one of its most consistent as he has been one of its ablest supporters since its inception.

The author pays a just tribute to his wife, whose recent death has deprived a large circle of friends of one whom all recognized as the gifted helpmeet of her husband. Of her Professor Gardner writes:

'But my debt to her is so great that I must not wholly pass her by. Whatever I may have accomplished owes to her more than I can express. I can but end in dedicating to her this brief memoir.'

We cannot leave this autobiography without stressing the deeply religious note which runs through it as indeed through the whole life of one whom it was the fashion in certain ecclesiastical circles to view askance as a destructive critic of Christianity. He writes in words as religious as they are modest:

'My real reason for writing is that I have a conviction which has steadily grown, that my life has been only in a less degree of my own planning: I have always felt the urging and control of a Spiritual Power who has led and guided me, and enabled me, in spite of very moderate powers, to accomplish certain ends, which at the time I did not realize, but which in looking back I see clearly.' H.D.A.M.

NEO-ANGLICANISM*

Studies of the Oxford Movement, both as a religious and as a social factor in nineteenth century history, abound, but the number of them which can be dignified by the title of 'authorities' is extremely small, and there is every need for a treatize which shall fittingly continue the work of such an author as Dean Church. Dr. Brilioth has supplied this gap and has succeeded in producing a work of rare merit. His sympathy with all things English has led him to a deep interest in the Tractarians, whilst his own religious standpoint, that of a Lutheran, gives him that attitude towards the Reformation which enables him to understand much of English Church history.

Dr. Brilioth starts with the High Church Party, whose influences he carefully discovers. He follows up with chapters on the origins of Evangelicalism and the Oriel Noctics. The background of the Oxford Movement is sketched, and Dr. Brilioth shows how Newman passed to a view of the English Church as a *via media,* proceeded to a crisis, brought to a head in part by the secession to Rome of his young disciple, Wm. Lockhart, and finally passed over himself into the fold of the Church of Rome. The book is brought to a close with two most important chapters dealing with justification and mysticism in its relation to sacramentalism.

In stressing the importance to Newman of the conception of the Anglican *via media,* Dr. Brilioth has undoubtedly struck the keynote of Newman's conception of the genius of the Church of England. That Church is to occupy a central position between Rome and Protestantism. It is at once Catholic and yet reformed. To use a famous modern phrase, it is 'a bridge Church.' Unfortunately for this type of argument, such an approach is quite unhistorical. The English Reformers took a totally different line and looked upon the foreign national Churches which had adopted a Presbyterian form of Church government, as being not only valid Churches but sister Churches of the Church of England. In such a writer as, for example, Bishop Jewel, there is a note of opposition to the Roman claims which seems lacking in Tract 90. Dr. Brilioth is probably correct in quoting with approval Archbishop Tait's remark that W. G. Ward worried Newman into writing Tract 90, and it must be pointed out that there is a vast difference between the Tract and Ward's 'Ideal of a Christian Church.' Newman sought to reconcile the articles with Roman doctrine, Ward claimed to hold the whole of Roman doctrine whilst subscribing to the Articles 'in a

* *The Anglican Revival.* By Dr. Y. Brilioth. (Longman, 1933. 5/-.)

non-natural sense'—an approach to the problem quite unlike Newman's. Yet it cannot, to-day, be too strongly stressed that the attitude of the Tractarians was not that of the old-fashioned High Church party whose main protests were against Calvinism, Latitudinarianism, and Erastianism. The convinced High-Churchmen of the 'Clapton Sect,' such men as Archdeacon Norris and Joshua Watson, were as opposed to the claim of Tract 90 as was so definite an Evangelical as William Goode. To them it seemed that the whole Reformation protest of the English Church against that of Rome was being overthrown.

Again, in estimating the work and value of the Oxford Movement, it must not be assumed that the Evangelicals were but indifferent Churchmen. It is true that their theology was a moderate Calvinism but, up to a point, so is that of the Articles, and it was no sign of bad Churchmanship that Charles Simeon rated the Prayer Book as being next only to the Bible in his affections. The truth is that the current horror of Liberalism, both political and theological, brought about by the French Revolution, and so well illustrated in Keble's Assize Sermon, and the parallel change in attitude towards the Middle Ages as the result of the reactionary Romantic Revival which produced the fiction of a Mediaeval Utopia, had produced a type of Churchmanship unknown in England since the Reformation and completely novel in its interpretation of history. It is illuminating to compare the pro-Roman strain in Tract 90 with the solid Protestantism of those ultra-High Churchmen, the later Non-Jurors.

The history of the Oxford Movement is the record of a tragic failure. It has moved a Protestant Church along the path to Rome—whereon many of its leaders finished their course—and it in no way succeeded in defeating the 'liberalism' against which its founders protested. The fact that it gave birth to what is glibly termed Neo-Anglicanism is beside the point, for Dr. Gore would have been as anathema to the original leaders of the movement as was Dr. Whateley. So often is it assumed that the present Anglo-Catholic Party was the logical product of the Tractarian movement that the fact is overlooked that this Party only came into being by the reversal of much that was inherent in Tractarian theology. For example, the realization of the social implications of the Incarnation and of the Sacraments was the work of Frederick Denison Maurice and of the *Lux Mundi* school, a work which Canon Liddon opposed to the bitter end. Again, the surrender to Biblical criticism was impossible to the original Tractarians and, as late as 1864, Dr. Pusey was willing to make the truth of Christianity turn upon the date of the *Book of Daniel*. Much of 'Neo-Anglicanism' is completely foreign to the whole Tractarian *ethos* and would have found no more bitter opponents than the original Tractarians—a point that should not be forgotten by those interested in and anxious for religious advance to-day. Just as the Jerusalem bishopric helped to disprove the theory of the *via media*, so the existence of Neo-Anglicanism helps to prove the impossibility of much of the Tractarian outlook for the modern world.

But we trust that we have said enough to send the reader to Dr. Brilioth's book. There are one or two slight blemishes. The opposition to the Movement of that worthy High-Churchman, Dean Burgon, might have found a place in the closely-written story; and two other famous opponents of the Movement are passed over, William Gooch and G. S. Faber; whilst it is quite incorrect to describe C. P. Golightly as 'a pugnacious and wire-pulling Evangelical.' He was not an Evangelical but a High-Churchman, whilst his pugnacity was natural expression of a profound distrust of the

Tractarians. He played a far larger part in the original opposition to Tract 90 than Dr. Brilioth's bare mention would lead one to suppose. The late Mr. Walter Walsh's books on the Oxford Movement deserve a kinder mention than they receive; they are certainly one-sided and the judgments are hasty and ill-formed, but they are well-documented, for Walsh had a vast knowledge of the Movement and its literature, and the quotations are always most fair. But these are indeed slight blemishes in a book which fully deserves the description 'most admirable,' applied to it by the Bishop of Gloucester in his preface.

F. H. Amphlett Micklewright.

HUMAN PROGRESS*

An up-to-date survey of the evolution of man, the customs of man, and the works of man, somewhat after the manner of the introduction to the subject by E. B. Tylor entitled *Anthropology*, which fascinated many of us when we were much younger, has long been a *desideratum*. A vast amount of work has been done, much of it field-work, since the publication of Tylor's book, and the whole subject has been envisaged from new points of view. Mr. A. M. Hocart, who in his latest book seeks to follow in Tylor's footsteps, is not only an anthropologist who has devoted some of the best years of his life to field work, but also one who has made a special study of languages and psychology. As those who have read his earlier books and articles will know, he is also endowed with that curiosity which seeks to know the real why and wherefore of things. It is no use repeating to him the old slogans. He will not accept the statement made so often by peoples of the lower culture, 'As our fathers did, we do.' That is not good enough. He must get to the bottom of things, and retorts, 'You have forgotten why you do certain things, but I will find out.'

It will be obvious that Mr. Hocart's book, besides being a record of man's varied achievements, presents new points of view. Thus, while it is full of information concerning such matters as the body, the mind, tradition, mechanism, clothing, food, fire, chemistry, the quest of life, sacraments, the soul, the healing art, history, speech, play, etc., it stimulates also and makes us think. It could hardly be more comprehensive. It provides the student and reader with a really adequate introduction to human history or the study of man; and it is the more valuable because at the end of each chapter it gives a bibliography which describes briefly the character of the more important works mentioned in it. The book supplies a need, and should find a place in many libraries, private and public.

M. A. Canney.

CORRESPONDENCE

THE ESSENCE OF TOLERANCE.

To the Editor of *The Modern Churchman*.

Sir,

Your January number is certainly stimulating. Three notable contributions are concerned with a call to action, and two of them call attention to the impatience of laymen, an aspect of modernism that is always treated sympathetically in this journal, but to which most of the clergy appear indifferent, if indeed they are aware of it. Many of them, as Mr. Stutchbury

* *The Progress of Man.* A Short Survey of his Evolution, his Customs, and his Works. By A. M. Hocart, late Archaeological Commissioner, Ceylon. (Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1933. 7/6 net.)

suggests, hopefully let sleeping dogs lie — a policy that forfeits the respect of the thinking laity for either their knowledge, honesty or intelligence. I do not blame the clergy in the least for this deplorable state of affairs. It is the inevitable result of the creeds and Articles to which they are tethered. They can no longer impose their beliefs on their flocks, as in the good old days when the clergy held the keys of knowledge, and their flocks have moved away from them. I am convinced that it is the petrified traditionalism enforced on the clergy, rather than the 'secularism' or 'paganism' of the laity, that accounts for the drift away from the Church during the last fifty years among the professional classes and those engaged in the creative arts. Surely Mr. Fisher is right. 'Every Sunday Modernists are called on to repeat prayers and to make confessions of faith in a form which they have ceased to hold. That is a fact which is rapidly undermining institutional religion and emptying the churches.' It is certainly the reason why I have ceased to go to church and have a simple service at home for my family instead. And it is the reason why I joined the Modern Churchmen's Union, and why I agree with Mr. Fisher's plea for a more energetic and radical policy. I do not underrate the good work of our active Organizing Secretary; I appreciate the immense value of Ripon Hall, and of this journal under your wise and fearless guidance; I do not forget how much we owe to Mr. Griffith and his collaborators for the admirable books and pamphlets they have produced. But we need a more active policy still. We have a large body of sympathizers whose active support we ought to secure. We need five or six local branches in every county to make the movement known to them.

With regard to practical aims, while in full agreement with all the objectives outlined in your Editorial, I am personally concerned to secure free thought for the clergy and to abolish the sacramental test for full membership of the Church, for the reasons I have given above. The most pressing need of the Modernist situation at the moment, in my judgment, is an evening service which would give expression to our common faith. Let all who are attached to the doctrines that divide us be free to worship God in their own ways, but let us have one liturgy in common, one service every Sunday that will do violence to the convictions of no one, but will focus our thoughts on the inner realities that unite us—Catholics, Quakers and Unitarians alike—'in the way of truth, . . . in unity of spirit, in the bond of peace and in righteousness of life.' Such a liturgy will not be evolved in a moment, or by one person or one congregation. But it would come in time if experiment in liturgy was as free as it has hitherto been in hymns. But it must evolve spontaneously from many sources, unhampered by the efforts of 'liturgiologists' to put new wine into old bottles.

I am convinced that this is the most creative approach to the Modernist problem. The Anglo-Catholic dream of converting modern England to mediaeval Christianity is doomed to failure, but it will persist so long as Modernism fails to give expression in liturgy to its creative power. If the people of this country could be sure of finding at their parish churches once a Sunday a service which enabled thought, feeling and sense of beauty to play their parts in giving satisfying expression to the essentials of Christian faith, without losing touch with reality, the churches would be full again, and the Church of England would be once again in fact what she is now only in name.

Yours truly,

TRANT LUARD.

Addington Green, W. Malling, Kent.
4th February, 1934.

SIR,

I cannot but think that Mr. F. G. Pearce makes a great mistake when he fancies Modernism renders it more difficult to look upon God as our loving Father. When I was a boy, in the nineteenth century, I was confronted with the dilemma that one must be either a materialistic atheist or a Catholic fundamentalist. As I could not dream of parting with God, I felt forced to try to believe in the verbal inspiration of the Old Testament. But much that one read there made a belief in God's love for all men almost impossible. Now, as a Modernist, I say cheerfully, with the psalmist, let God be true and every man a liar! If I read any story that seems to teach that God was ever cruel or unjust, I can believe that this was a mistake. Like Mr. Pearce himself, I may feel that in some cases it may be wiser not to disturb the faith of a simple believer for a while; but all the time I think to myself, 'When the poor fellow is able to bear it, what good news I have in store for him!'

E. E. BRADFORD, D.D.

Nordelph Vicarage,
Downham Market, Norfolk.

SIR,

As an old member of the Modern Churchmen's Union, I write to protest against the incentive to strife contained in the article headed 'The Danger of Reserve' published in the *Modern Churchman* of December last.

The article assumes that there is no question as to what constitutes Christian Truth. That assumption begs the question. It is just because there are different views as to what constitutes the Truth that there is disputation.

What the world needs more than anything else just now is a truce from that sort of thing. If Protestant Christians would join hands in demanding a wider outlook and more liberal consideration of differing views, we should do much to weaken the power of Roman Catholicism on the one hand and extreme Evangelicalism on the other.

Surely we ought to read some lesson from the events of 1914-1918, when more than ten millions of young Christians killed each other, nearly two thousand years after the birth of the Prince of Peace. Christianity failed to avert that calamity, not because our Lord Jesus Christ's message was meaningless, but because theological disputation, with its accompanying horrors and martyrdoms, has turned men's thoughts away from His real purpose in coming to earth. He came to teach men about the Fatherhood of Almighty God and the brotherhood of man: men have debased His teaching by making it an excuse for enforcing their own views of its interpretation in a spirit which must give infinite pain to the tender heart of the most perfect gentleman who ever lived. That is what Jesus Christ was.

It is just that spirit of 'Contending for the Truth' (or what a particular individual thinks is the truth) which has hindered the great cause which brought Christ Jesus to earth. Let us do all we can to discourage strife as to what is the 'Truth,' and unite in fighting those evils which are the direct result of our losing sight of our Lord's gracious visit to mankind. In other words, let us concentrate on the essential thing.

Yours truly,

F. S. TATHAM.

Pietermaritzburg, South Africa.
17*th January*, 1934.

THE MODERN CHURCHMEN'S UNION COUNCIL ELECTION, 1934.

SIR,

I shall be obliged if you will kindly give publicity to the following official notice to members of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

By the Constitution the following elected members of the Council retire on the day of the Annual General Meeting (May 30th, 1934), and are not eligible for re-election, *viz.* Miss A. M. Ashley, Rev. J. F. W. Boden-Worsley, Rev. K. G. Budd, Rev. P. Gardner-Smith, Rev. G. A. K. Hervey, Mr. Claud Mullins, Dr. J. W. Walker, Dr. Douglas White, and Sir Arnold Wilson.

The following co-opted members of the Council retire on May 30th, but are eligible for re-election, *viz.* the Rev. Canon J. S. Bezzant, the Hon. Gilbert Coleridge, Mr. Arthur Davies, the Rev. E. St. G. Schomberg, the Ven. Archdeacon V. F. Storr, and the Rev. H. J. Trueman.

Ten members of the Council are to be elected this year, and the nominations of candidates must reach the Secretary not later than March 31st. The names must be proposed and seconded by members of the Union. If more than ten nominations are received, voting papers will be sent to all members of the Union.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

T. J. WOOD.

The Church House, Westminster, London, S.W.1.

January 23rd, 1934.

MODERN CHURCHMEN'S SPRING CONFERENCE, 1934.

SIR,

I shall be grateful if you will kindly allow me to inform those who are interested in the Spring Conference that a Week-end Conference will be held at High Leigh, Hoddesdon, Herts, from May 5th to 7th, on the subject of 'The Gospel of Modernism.' Details will be available later.

The subject of the positive Gospel of Modernism so admirably summarized by yourself in the *Modern Churchman* for November, together with the Rev. R. D. Richardson's book, might well form the basis of discussions at Branch Meetings or Groups between now and May, so that members can come prepared with contributions on the subject.

Members are reminded that the *Modernist Series* can be obtained through the office of the Union.

I am, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

T. J. WOOD.

The Church House, Westminster, London, S.W.1.

January 23rd, 1934.

PRAYER OF ST. CHRYSOSTOM.

SIR,

The English form of this prayer is a direct translation from the Latin version and is unsatisfactory because it suggests that the united prayer of two or three will be granted in the form and at the time at which it is asked. This we know is not true.

St. Chrysostom lived from 357 to 407 and wrote in Greek, and if it be granted that he was the author of the prayer, the best authority will be the Greek version in the so-called Liturgy of St. Chrysostom dating from the ninth century. I give the quotation from the Greek version, and it will be seen at once what a slovenly, unscholarly translation the Latin version is.

> *ὁ καὶ δυσὶ καὶ τρισὶ συμφωνοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί σου, τὰς αἰτήσεις παρέχειν ἐπαγγειλάμενος· Αὐτὸς καὶ νῦν τῶν δούλων σου τὰ αἰτήματα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον πλήρωσον . . .*

Note first that *ἐπὶ τῷ ὀνόματί σου* has not the recognized meaning of *εἰς τὸ ὄνομά σου* and then that *αἰτήσεις* are to be translated into *τὰ αἰτήματα πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον* which is the only condition in which petitions can be fulfilled; and incidentally it is *καὶ τρισί* and not *ἢ τρισί*.

I have no liturgical skill, but I venture to give this bald paraphrase of what the Greek prayer conveys to me:

> 'All ruling God, who hast given us grace with one accord to make our common supplications to Thee, and hast assured us when two and three are calling together upon Thy name Thou art present in our midst; translate our blind stammering cries (*αἰτήσεις*) into prayers that can be granted (*αἰτήματα*) in harmony with Thy divine will and the coming of Thy kingdom, and so do Thou Thyself fulfil them, granting us in this world knowledge of Thy truth and in the world to come life everlasting.'

This is an exquisite commentary on all prayer, and gives the inner meaning of that beautiful close to nearly all our collects, 'through Jesus Christ our Lord.'

Perhaps I may add that the English and Latin versions seem to stress an unscholarly translation of *Matt.* xviii, 19, *γενήσεται αὐτοῖς . . .*, and of Matt. vi, 7, and Lk. xi, 9, *Αἰτεῖτε, καὶ δοθήσεται ὑμῖν*, which I take to mean 'something will occur to them from my Father in heaven' and 'a boon will be given them,' as we all know the amazing way in which worrying anxieties have been relieved.

A. S. Percival.

Shenley, Hook Heath, Woking.

MARK PATTISON.

Sir,

In a very interesting article on Mark Pattison in the current number of the *Modern Churchman*, you mentioned that the character of Edward Casanbon in *Middlemarch* was founded upon him. I have seen it stated, though I cannot recall where, that he also figures in two now forgotten novels, namely as a somewhat unpleasing character in Rhoda Broughton's *Belinda*, and also as the Squire, Roger Wendover, in Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Robert Elsmere*.

A. M. Coleman.

DISINTERESTED SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH.

Sir,

May a mere layman be allowed to comment on Mr. Hardwick's letter in the January issue of your journal?

With much of what Mr. Hardwick has to say (particularly in his first paragraph), one cannot but be in entire sympathy. It is particularly with respect to the paragraph on the 'Disinterestedness of Science' that I would join issue.

Mr. Hardwick implies that much of the research being done at Universities is devoted to subjects of industrial and military importance. As a modern industrial chemical researcher I can assure him that our chief complaint about the Universities is that such of their 'research' as is worthy of the name is too academic for words, and that the bulk of it is an insult to the title 'research,' being merely degree-hunting. Outside the Universities there are few 'Research Institutes' of a public nature, and the chief of these is the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. Surely a body which owes its creation and preservation to industry would be at fault if the greater portion of its work were not of value to industry. However, a vast amount of the work carried out by this particular organization is of 'vital importance for human welfare,' as witness, for example, the work on Low Temperature Carbonisation. One cannot trespass on your valuable space to explain how that work is of humanistic value: a little reflection should make it evident.

The research carried out by the Royal Society and kindred organizations is definitely 'pure research' and is of no immediate industrial importance.

The only other research is that carried out in the private research laboratories of industrial concerns and Manufacturers' Associations. While such research is carried on mainly with an eye to the balance sheet, I can assure Mr. Hardwick that where facts or information of more general interest and value are met with in the course of such work, it is the exception, rather than the rule, to neglect their thorough examination.

The other point in Mr. Hardwick's second paragraph is the question: 'Why is it that chemical and physical research flourish, whereas biological, psychological, and sociological research languish for lack of workers?'

Chemical and physical research flourish because Chemistry and Physics are exact sciences, of which so much is known, that quite ordinary individuals can be trained to carry out research in them.

A perusal of the scientific periodicals for the last few years shows biological research to be anything but languishing. Biology is a comparatively new science, but it *is* a science, and is receiving a great deal of devoted attention.

Psychology and Sociology are only pseudo-sciences as yet—the description of some of the experiments (save the word) carried out by workers in these fields causes any true scientist to writhe in anguish — and that is why they do not receive more attention. No great scientist has yet seen anything worthy of his attention in these subjects: when one does perhaps they will cease to be '-ologies' and become 'sciences.' Until then they will continue to languish.

Before a man condemns his fellows as irrational, he should be sure that he himself cannot be charged with that imperfection. Much of Mr. Hardwick's letter is neither rational nor logical.

W. S. PAYNE.

Brades Village, Oldbury.

February 7th, 1934.

[We regret that pressure on our space this month has permitted us to publish only a selection from the correspondence addressed to the Editor.—ED., *M.C.*]